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DEFAMATION OF RELIGION: RUMORS
OF ITS DEATH ARE GREATLY
EXAGGERATED
Robert C. Blitt†
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the recent decisions by the United Nations
(“UN”) Human Rights Council and General Assembly to adopt
consensus   resolutions   aimed   at   “combating intolerance, negative
stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to
violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief.”  
These  resolutions  represent  an  effort  to  move  past  a  decade’s  worth  
of contentious roll call votes in favor of prohibiting defamation of
religion within the international human rights framework. Although
labeled  “historic”  resolutions,  this Article argues that the UN’s  new  
compromise approach endorsed in 2011—and motivated in part by
the desire to end years of acrimonious debate over the acceptability
of shielding religious beliefs from insult and criticism—is problematic
because it risks being exploited to sanction the continued prohibition
on defamation of religion and perpetuation of ensuing human rights
violations on the ground.
After briefly considering the history of defamation of religion at
the UN and the strategies employed by its principal proponent, the
Organization  of  Islamic  Cooperation  (“OIC”), this Article turns to an
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. This Article
elaborates on remarks made during a panel discussion titled Blasphemy, Religious Defamation,
and Religious Nationalism: Threats to Civil Speech and Its Suppression at the 2012 Annual
Meeting for The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) in Washington, D.C. The
author wishes to thank Jessie Hill and Bernie Meyler for extending the invitation to participate
on the panel and also to John M. Murray and the staff of the Case Western Reserve Law Review
for their diligent and timely editorial review of the draft manuscript.
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assessment of the   UN   Human   Rights   Council’s   2011   consensus  
Resolution   16/18.   In   light   of   the   resolution’s   objectives,   this Article
explores the viability of the new international consensus around
“combatting  intolerance”  and  tests to what extent, if any, the concept
of defamation of religion may be waning in practice. To this end, this
Article weighs statements, resolutions, and other undertakings of the
OIC and its member states with a particular emphasis on activities
that follow the adoption of Resolution 16/18.
Based on this analysis, the Article concludes that the resolutions
on combatting intolerance passed in 2011 represent a Clausewitzian
moment for many governments, particularly among OIC member
states. Essentially, support for the new international consensus on
combatting intolerance represents a cynical and strategic decision to
continue the campaign to legitimate a ban on defamation of religion
by other means. Accordingly, even if defamation of religion per se is
on hiatus from the UN, absent additional measures—including a
decisive   repudiation   of   the   concept’s   validity—further international
efforts to implement measures for combatting intolerance risk
enabling an alternative framework in which governments continue
justifying, in the name of protecting religious belief, domestic
measures that punish the exercise of freedom of expression and
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.
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INTRODUCTION
From   1999   through   2011,   the   United   Nations   (“UN”)   hosted   an  
annual struggle between one group of states rallying to establish an
international norm prohibiting defamation of religion and another
group that was staunchly opposed to such a move. Over the course of
twelve years, the debate moved from the defunct UN Human Rights
Commission  to  the  UN  Human  Rights  Council  (“UNHRC”)  and  even  
spilled into the General Assembly   (“UNGA”)   and   other   UN  
substructures. These UN bodies passed nearly twenty resolutions that,
among   other   things,   “[w]elcom[ed]   . . . the enactment or
strengthening of domestic frameworks and legislation to prevent the
defamation   of   religions,”1 “[u]nderscor[ed] the need to combat
defamation of religions,”2 and purported to authorize limitations on
the  right  to  freedom  of  expression  based  on  “respect  for  religions  and  
beliefs.”3 In addition to resolutions, these UN bodies also tasked
different Special Rapporteurs, the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and even the UN Secretary General with compiling a total of
nearly thirty reports dedicated to defamation of religion.4
Admittedly, support for the international prohibition of defamation
of religion had been dwindling in more recent years, to the point
where the combination of abstaining states and states voting against
the annual resolutions outnumbered those voting in their favor.5
Nevertheless, both the UNHRC and UNGA continued to pass these
G.A. Res. 64/156, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156 (Mar. 8, 2010).
Id. ¶ 21.
3 G.A. Res. 61/164, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/164 (Feb. 21, 2007).
4 Robert C. Blitt, The   Bottom   up   Journey   of   “Defamation   of   Religion”   from   Muslim  
States to the United Nations: A Case Study of the Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas, in 56
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY, SPECIAL ISSUE HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW
POSSIBILITIES/NEW PROBLEMS, app. A, at 121, 200 (Appendix A) (Austin Sarat ed., 2011).
5 Robert C. Blitt, Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging International Human
Rights   Norms?   The   Challenge   of   “Defamation   of   Religion”, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 19
(2010).
1
2
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resolutions successfully by a majority vote.6 Thus, the gradual decline
in support should not diminish the diplomatic feat represented by
UNHRC Resolution 16/18, which was adopted by consensus in
March 2011.7 Notably, this resolution successfully expunged any
mention of defamation of religion by the UN for the first time in over
a decade.8
More impressively still, by sidestepping explicit rejection of the
defamation-of-religion   concept,   the   resolution’s   substitute   language  
allowed the negotiating parties to extrapolate diametrically opposed
messages from its content. Thus, on one side, the U.S. was able to
claim   an   end  to   an   acrimonious   era   responsible   for   creating   a  “false  
divide that pit[ted] religious sensitivities against freedom of
expression.”9 At the same time, the Organization for Islamic
Cooperation (“OIC”)10—the principle backer of defamation of
religion resolutions at the UN—was able to declare Resolution 16/18
nothing  more  than  the  “exploring [of an] alternative approach[].”11 In
this vein, the OIC continues to advance support for defamation of
religion   “on   bloc”   among   its   member   states   “in the true spirit of
solidarity and joint action on matters of vital concern . . . .”12 Placed
in context, these diametrically opposed positions signal a continuing
divide between the sides and raise questions concerning the viability
of implementing any consensus resolution in a manner that will
accord with existing international human rights law.
After briefly considering the tumultuous history of efforts to
secure an international prohibition against defamation of religion at
the UN, including strategies championed by its proponents, this
Article assesses the   UN   Human   Rights   Council’s   2011   consensus  
Resolution 16/18, as well as statements made before and immediately
6 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156, supra note 1 (passing a resolution aimed at
combating the defamation of religions).
7 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and
Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons
Based on Religion or Belief, 16th Sess., Mar. 24, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (Apr. 12,
2011).
8 See id. ¶  1  (stating  that  the  concern  was  “serious  instances  of  derogatory  stereotyping,  
negative profiling and stigmatization of persons based on their religion  or  belief”).
9 Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y   of   State,   Remarks at the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) High-Level Meeting on Combating Religious Intolerance (July 15,
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168636.htm.
10 This group was formerly known as the Organization for the Islamic Conference. Org. of
Islamic Cooperation [OIC], On Changing the Name of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, Res. No. 4/38-Org, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-38/2011/ORG/RES (June 28–30, 2011).
11 OIC, On Combating Defamation of Religions, Res. No. 35/38-POL, compiled in
Resolutions on Political Affairs, at 79, ¶ 15, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL (June
28–30, 2011) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL].
12 Id.
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following   its   adoption.   In   light   of   the   resolution’s   objectives,   this
Article moves on to explore several related developments to ascertain
to what extent, if any, the concept of defamation of religion may be
waning and whether the international consensus around   “combatting  
intolerance” represents a viable alternative strategy moving forward.
Among other things, this Article considers OIC statements and
resolutions pertaining to defamation—particularly those issued
following the adoption of consensus resolutions by the UNHRC and
General Assembly, as well activities in other UN bodies, and other
related developments on the ground in OIC member states. This
analysis demonstrates that   the   shift   to   “combatting   intolerance”  
within the UN has suppressed but not resolved a fundamental and
ongoing  dispute  between  the  “West”  and  certain  other  states  over  the  
nature of international human rights protections and the value of
universalism. By shifting this debate to an ambiguous and undertheorized area of law in the name of pursuing and validating an
“international   consensus,”13 these new resolutions risk creating an
opportunity for certain states to prosecute perceived affronts to
religious belief with renewed vigor under the imprimatur of
international law. The likelihood of such a scenario is only heightened
by the fact that the OIC—the   world’s   largest   international
organization after the UN—continues to actively identify and endorse
defamation of religion as a lawful and recognized international norm
inexorably and legitimately linked to the goal of combating
intolerance.
Faced with this reality, this Article concludes that the resolutions
on combatting intolerance represent a Clausewitzian moment for
many governments, particularly among OIC member states. In this
respect, support for the new international consensus on combatting
intolerance represents merely a cynical and strategic decision to
continue the campaign to legitimize a ban on defamation of religion
by other means. While defamation of religion per se might be on
hiatus from the UN, absent additional clarification—including a
decisive   repudiation   of   the   concept’s   validity—further international
efforts directed at combatting intolerance risk enabling an alternative
framework for governments to continue justifying domestic measures
that punish the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of
religion or belief in the name of protecting one or more select
religious beliefs.
13 Suzan Johnson Cook, U.S. Ambassador  at  Large  for  Int’l  Religious  Freedom,  Remarks  
for
Istanbul
Process
Conference
(Dec.
12,
2011),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/178640.htm.
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I. QUO VADIS DEFAMATION OF RELIGION?
A. Origins and Early History
For the OIC, the need to prohibit defamation of religion—or, more
accurately, defamation of Islam—has grown into an overriding raison
d’être. In the face of initial controversies at the UN predating the first
defamation of religion resolution issued in 1999,14 OIC member states
proclaimed that the motivation for insulting Islam stemmed only from
the desire “to generate conflict with Islamic peoples”15 and flatly
asserted that   “the   right   to   freedom   of   thought,   opinion   and  
expression could in no case justify blasphemy.”16
In 1999, the OIC moved to have the UN Commission on Human
Rights (“UNCHR”)  explicitly  validate  this  perspective.  Representing  
the OIC, Pakistan called for the adoption of a resolution that urged
states   “to   take   all   necessary   measures   to   combat   hatred,  
discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and
coercion”   directed at the religion of Islam.17 Germany’s  
representative  criticized  this  approach  “since  it  referred  exclusively  to  
the negative stereotyping of Islam, whereas other religions had been
and continued to be subjected to various forms of discrimination,
intolerance  and  even  persecution.”18 Germany further reported that it
“had  unfortunately  been  impossible  to  find  common  ground”  in  initial  
negotiations because  OIC  member  states  “had  persisted  in  making the
draft resolution exclusive in nature and had found it necessary to
submit sub-amendments to amendments designed to correct the
balance  of  the  text.”19
Ultimately,   further   negotiation   led   to   the   UNCHR’s   consensus  
approval   of   a   resolution   entitled   “Defamation of religions.”20 At the
time, Pakistan   hailed   the   OIC   member   states’   “considerable  

See Blitt, supra note 4, at 142–43.
U.N.   ESCOR,   Comm’n   on   Human   Rights,   Subcomm’n   On   Prevention of
Discrimination and Prot. of Minorities, 49th Sess., 35th mtg. ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/SR.35 (Aug. 27, 1997) (providing testimony of the observer for Indonesia,
“speaking  on  behalf  of  the  member  countries  of  the  Organization  of  the  Islamic Conference”).  
16 U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 65th mtg. ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.65 (Dec. 13, 1994)
(providing testimony of the representative from Iran, noting   “the   opinion   expressed   by   the  
Organization  of  the  Islamic  Conference”).
17 U.N.   ESCOR,   Comm’n   on Human Rights, 55th Sess., para. 9, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999) (draft resolution).
18 U.N.   ESCOR,   Comm’n   on   Human   Rights,   55th   Sess.,   61st   mtg.   ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/SR.61 (Apr. 29, 1999).
19 Id. ¶ 9.
20 Comm’n  on  Human  Rights  Res.  1999/82, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/82 (Apr. 30, 1999).
14
15
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flexibility”   in   agreeing   to   a   compromise   resolution.21 Germany, on
behalf of the European Union (“EU”), stressed that   the   “last-minute
agreement reached should not . . . hide the fact that a high degree of
uncertainty   remained   as   to   the   expediency   of   the   Commission’s  
continuing   to   deal   with   the   issue   in   that   way   and   in   that   context,”  
adding that “they did not attach any legal meaning to the term
‘defamation’  as  used  in the  title.”22 Despite this view, the consensus
resolution triggered the first mandated UN reporting on the topic and
positioned   the   UNCHR   “to   remain   seized   of   the   matter”   moving  
forward.23
The   term   “seized   of   the   matter”   captures   literally   the   UN’s  
preoccupation with defamation of religion over the decade that
followed. In addition, to attention morphing beyond the relatively
provincial domain   of   the   UN’s   specialized   human   rights   body   and  
into the larger (and arguably more important) General Assembly,
defamation of religion received frequent references in subsequent
annual resolutions to the point where the term was being referenced
between ten to fifteen times per resolution.24 Notably, this expansion
was accompanied by a shift away from invoking defamation in the
relatively harmless context of preambulary front matter to including it
in the more significant operative paragraphs of a given resolution.25
This change was not accidental. Rather, it coincided with the
OIC’s   stated   desire   to   secure   “[o]perative   provisions prohibiting
blasphemy . . . in the text  of  [defamation  resolutions].”26 Moreover, it
is in part because of this subtle yet dramatic shift that the OIC felt
sufficiently empowered by 2009 to declare that a norm prohibiting
defamation of religion had:
repeatedly been observed to command support by a majority
of the UN member states—a support that transcended the
confines of the OIC Member States. The succession of
UNGA and UNHRC resolutions on the defamation of
religions makes it a stand alone concept with international
legitimacy. It should not be made to stand out by creating the
21 U.N.   ESCOR,   Comm’n   on   Human   Rights,   55th   Sess.,   62nd   mtg.   ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/SR.62 (Apr. 30, 1999).
22 Id. ¶ 9. Indeed, at no point in over ten years did the UN ever put forth a working
definition of the chimera term “defamation of religion.”  Blitt, supra note 5, at 16.
23 Comm’n  on  Human  Rights  Res.  1999/82,  supra note 20, para. 7.
24 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/156, supra note 1 (using   the   term   “defamation”   12  
times).
25 See Blitt, supra note 4.
26 OIC Secretary-General, Secretary  General’s  Report  On  Cooperation  Between  the  OIC  
and Regional & International Organizations, ¶ 23, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/ICFM-33/POL/SG.REP.13
(2006).
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impression that it somehow encroaches upon the freedom of
expression.
....
[Accordingly, a]ny denial of these facts constitutes a
contradiction of the established position of the international
community, the international legitimacy and above all the
main provisions of international law and international
humanitarian law.27
To underscore its vow to secure an international prohibition on the
defamation of religion at the UN,28 the OIC regularly passed its own
internal resolutions addressing defamation of Islam that called into
question existing international norms related to non-discrimination
and equality, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion or belief
for every individual.29 Beyond these annual resolutions, the OIC saw
fit in its revised 2008 charter to establish “combat[ing]  defamation  of  
Islam”  as  one  of  the  organization’s  primary  objectives.30 To that end,
the OIC requires, as a precondition for obtaining observer status, that
interested states provide a commitment to prohibit the defamation of
Islam.31
Despite  the  OIC’s  consistent  position,  its  promulgation  of  a  norm  
proscribing defamation of Islam remains deeply flawed for several
reasons. First, the application and enforcement of such a
blasphemy prohibition typically is discriminatory in practice
insofar as it protects only the government-sanctioned version of
Islam.32 Second,   the   OIC’s   requirement   that this offense be
27 Second Rep. of the OIC Observatory on Islamophobia, 36th Sess., May 23–25, 2009,
4–5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC–CS–2ndOBS–REP–FINAL (May 10, 2009).
28 See OIC, On Combating Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against
Islam, Res. No. 34/34-POL, ¶ 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/34-ICFM/2007/POL/R.34   (calling   “on   the  
Human Rights Council to adopt a universal declaration to incriminate the defamation of
religions”). Masood   Khan,   Pakistan’s   UN   ambassador,   also   reminded   the   UNHRC   that   the  
OIC’s   ultimate   objective   was   nothing   less   than   a   “new   instrument   or   convention”   addressing  
defamation. Steven Edwards, UN Anti-Blasphemy Measures Have Sinister Goals, Observers
Say,
CANWEST
NEWS
SERVICE
(Nov.
24,
2008),
http://www2.canada.com/theprovince/news/story.html?id=9b8e3a6d-795d-440f-a5de6ff6e78c78d5.
29 For a more detailed analysis of the resolutions leading up to 2010, see Blitt, supra note
4, at 155.
30 O.I.C. Charter art. 1, para. 12.
31 Under Article 6 of the 2011 rules governing observer status at the OIC, an “application  
for Observer Status . . . shall   include   the   applicant’s   commitment   to   and   respect   for   the  
principles and objectives of the Charter . . . .”   Rules Governing Observer Status at the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/4-EGG/2011/RES.OS/FINAL.
32 In  certain  cases,  other  select  “divine  religions”  may  be  afforded  protection,  at  least  on  
paper.
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criminalized is at odds with international efforts to limit penalties
for conventional defamation offenses to civil liability only. Third,
and   possibly   most   problematic,   the   OIC’s   impetus   for   protecting
Islam by manipulating the framework of international human
rights upends the foundational understanding that rights belong to
individuals rather than subjective concepts or beliefs.33
B. Defamation of Religion Creep: Early Efforts to Blend Defamation
into Incitement
The magnitude of the flaws associated with defamation of religion
virtually assured the decade of clashes at the UN. Indeed, these flaws
may also help explain the OIC’s attempt to legitimize the end goal of
protecting Islam against criticism or insult by other means. For
example, alongside its diplomatic effort to secure an annual
defamation of religion resolution, the OIC embarked upon an
increasingly contrived campaign to equate criticism of Islam with
incitement to religious hatred. This “alternative” approach—
embodied   in   the   OIC’s   position   within   the   UNHRC’s   Ad   Hoc  
Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards to the
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (“Ad   Hoc   Committee”)34—represents nothing more
than an effort to “reclassify”   defamation of religion within the legal
framework of incitement to make it more palatable to states that have
either abstained from or voted against the resolutions on defamation.35

For a more detailed exploration of these problems, see Blitt, supra note 4.
The Ad Hoc Committee is a UNHRC-created body established in 2006 and mandated
with elaborating inter alia “a convention or additional protocol(s) to the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [“CERD”]  . . . providing
new normative standards aimed at combating . . . incitement to racial and religious hatred.”  
Human Rights Council Dec. 3/103, Global Efforts for the Total Elimination of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Follow-Up to the
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance and the Effective Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action, ¶ (a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/3/103 (Apr. 23, 2007). The UNHRC’s   decision to
establish the Ad Hoc Committee was split along voting lines similar to those for the defamation
of religion resolutions. See id. (showing   most   countries   traditionally   considered   “western”  
voting against the decision and many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, voting for the decision).
35 Here, it is worth recalling that the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has
called on governments to “refrain   from introducing new norms which will pursue the same
goals as defamation laws under a different legal terminology such as disinformation and
dissemination  of  false  information.”  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution
60/251  of  March  2006   Entitled   “Human  Rights   Council,” ¶ 82, Human Rights Council, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/4/27 (Jan. 2, 2007) (by Ambeyi Ligabo).
33
34

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2040812

4/19/2012 1:07:09 PM

356

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

The decision to create the Ad Hoc Committee is particularly
remarkable given that similar earlier efforts failed to demonstrate the
need for either a convention or additional protocol to the CERD as a
means   of   “gap   filling”   related   to incitement to religious hatred. For
example, experts appointed by the UNHRC to address the content and
scope of substantive gaps in existing international instruments to
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related
intolerance  concluded  “that  religious  intolerance  combined  with  racial  
and xenophobic prejudices is adequately covered under international
human  rights  instruments.”36 The experts concluded that the gap was
not in the international instruments themselves, but only in their
application, which the UN treaty bodies could remedy by issuing
guidance   “as   to   the   interpretative   scope   . . . [and] threshold of
application . . . .”37 Reinforcing this conclusion, the 2007 Study of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination made no
mention whatsoever of measures to prevent defamation of religion or
incitement to religious hatred.38
As part of its lobbying efforts within the Ad Hoc Committee, the
OIC has sought to blur the critical distinction between defamation of
religion and incitement by proposing the following:
[The adoption of] some sort of additional protocol or
universal declaration for codifying freedom of expression in
the context of human responsibilities. It may be called an
additional   protocol   or   universal   declaration   on   ‘‘freedom   of  
expression  and  human  responsibilities’’  . . . a comprehensive
framework is needed for analyzing national laws as well as
understanding their provisions. This could then be compiled
in a single universal document as guidelines for legislation—

36 Human
Rights Council, Intergovernmental Working Grp. on the Effective
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Report on the Study by
the Five Experts on the Content and Scope of Substantive Gaps in the Existing International
Instruments to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, ¶
130, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/WG.3/6 (Aug. 27, 2007). At most, the experts suggested that the
CERD committee   “may   wish   to   consider   adopting   a   recommendation   stating   explicitly   the  
advantages of multicultural education in combating   religious   intolerance.”   Id. The group also
endorsed  “the  importance  of  multicultural  education,  including  education  on  the  Internet,  aimed  
at promoting understanding, tolerance, peace and friendly relations between communities and
nations”  as  a  means  of combating defamation rather than any criminal sanctions. Id. ¶ 149.
37 Id. ¶ 152.
38 Human
Rights Council, Intergovernmental Working Grp. on the Effective
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Study of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Possible Measures to Strengthen
Implementation Through Optional Recommendations or the Update of its Monitoring
Procedures, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/WG.3/7 (June 15, 2007).
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aimed at countering “defamation of or incitement to religious
hatred and violence.”39
To further obfuscate the distinction between defamation and
incitement, the OIC has continued to advocate that the Ad Hoc
Committee endorse prohibitions   on   “deliberate and premeditated
insults and ridiculing,”   “malicious   and   insulting   attacks,” and
“ridiculing   and   insulting   interpretation”   of   Islam40 backed by
sweeping criminal sanctions. Supporting   this   position,   the   OIC’s  
voting allies within the Africa Group (which itself includes OIC
member states) have argued  that  the  ‘‘scourges’’  of  “‘Islamophobia,’
‘Anti-Semitism,’ ‘Christianophobia’ and ‘ideological racism’”  should  
“be criminalized in all their manifestations, and made punishable
offences  in  accordance  with  international  human  rights  law.”41 Under
the  theme  ‘‘[a]dvocacy  and  incitement  to  racial,  ethnic,  national and
religious  hatred,” the Africa Group demanded the Ad Hoc Committee
endorse criminal punishment   for   those   perpetrating,   “instigating,
aiding or abetting”  the  following actions:
(a) Public insults and defamation . . . against a person or
group of persons on the grounds of their . . . religion . . . ;
(b) The public expression of prejudice that has the purpose or
effect of denigrating a group of persons on the basis of the
above-mentioned grounds;
(c) The public dissemination or distribution, or the production
of written, audio or visual or other material containing

39 Transcript of the Concluding Session of the Seminar on Articles 19 and 20, Organized
By the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, Switz., Oct. 2, 2008, Remarks
by Mojtaba Amiri Vahid, Deputy of the Permanent Observer Missions of the OIC to the UN
Office in Geneva, 3 (emphasis added) (transcript on file with the author). In the same statement,
Vahid downplayed the efficacy of education and dialogue without the imposition of additional
criminal sanctions.
40 These  forms  of  expression  are  expressly  rejected  in  the  text  of  the  ambassador’s  letter.
Letter from Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations and Other International
Organizations (Oct. 29, 2009), in Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of
Discrimination: Comprehensive Implementation of and Follow-Up to the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action, Human Rights Council, Feb. 17, 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/CRP.1
(Annex 1).
41 Human Rights Council, Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of Complementary
Standards, Outcome Referred to in Paragraph 2(D) of the Road Map on the Elaboration of
Complementary Standards, ¶ 6(d), UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2 (Aug. 26, 2009) [hereinafter UN
Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2]. See also African  Group  Action  Points  for  the  “Outcome”  Document  on  
Complementary International Standards (submitted by Egypt on behalf of the Africa Group)
(on file with author) (stating same).
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manifestations of racism and racial discrimination . . .
[including defamation of religion].42
Similarly,   addressing   the   theme   of   ‘‘[d]iscrimination based on
religion  or  belief’’  within  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee,  the  OIC  called for,
inter alia, criminal liability   for   those   “who  commit,  instigate,   or   aid  
and abet . . . directly  or  indirectly”  the  following:
(d) . . . public insults and defamation threats against a person
or a grouping of persons on the grounds of their . . . religion
. . . ; [and]
(e) . . . publication of material that negatively stereotypes,
insults, or uses offensive language on matters regarded by
followers of any religion or belief as sacred or inherent to
their dignity as human beings, with the aim of protecting their
fundamental human rights.43
Nowhere in the OIC’s   submissions   testing   the   boundaries   of  
advocacy and incitement to racial, ethnic, national and religious
hatred does the organization stipulate or explore the need for
normative standards that would balance protection against
“defamation” with the right to freedom of expression and freedom of
religion or belief. In this context, the OIC fails to acknowledge or
address standards that would relate to evidence of actual defamation,
the requirement of intent, ascertaining the connection between
perceived insult and actual incitement, or the principle of
proportionality.
Also missing is any recognition that Article 20(2) of the
International   Covenant   on   Civil   and   Political   Rights   (“ICCPR”)   is  
intended to target only the most extreme purposeful advocacy of
incitement to imminent forms of discrimination, hostility, and
42 UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2, supra note 41, at ¶ 20 (emphasis added). The OIC’s  leap
towards inclusion of defamation of religion is premised on the finding by a “former   Special  
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance . . . that the increasing trend in defamation of religions cannot be dissociated from a
profound reflection on the ominous trends of racism [and] racial discrimination . . . .”  Id. ¶ 69. A
letter  from  Iran’s  mission  to  the  UN  reiterates  this  position.  See Letter from Permanent Mission
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights AntiDiscrimination Unit (May 29, 2009) (on file with author).
43 UN Doc. A/HRC/AC.1/2/2, supra note 41, at ¶ 27 (emphasis added). The language in
Part (d) indicates that the Ad Hoc Committee may have lost something in translation. The
original OIC submission does not require that the offense of defamation be directed at a person:
“legal  restrictions  to  public  insults  and  defamation,  public  incitement  to  violence,  threat  against  
a person or a grouping of persons . . . on the grounds of their race, colour, language, religion,
nationality, or national or ethnic   origin.”   Letter from Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the
United Nations and other International Organizations (May 30, 2009).
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violence.44 This high threshold prompted the UN Special Rapporteur
on freedom of religion  or  belief  to  conclude  that  “expressions  should
only be prohibited under Article 20 if they constitute incitement to
imminent acts of violence or discrimination against a specific
individual  or  group.”45 The Special Rapporteur further cautioned:
against confusion between a racist statement and an act of
defamation of religion. The elements that constitute a racist
statement are not the same as those that constitute a statement
defaming a religion. To this extent, the legal measures, and in
particular the criminal measures, adopted by national legal
systems to fight racism may not necessarily be applicable to
defamation of religion.46
Against these findings, the   OIC’s   demand   for   wide-ranging
mandatory criminal liability for defamation-based offenses in the
context of incitement to religious hatred neglects the need for a fact
specific and contextual inquiry into such prosecutions and, moreover,
is woefully out of touch with existing international norms. The blunt
conclusion issued jointly nearly a decade ago by the UN and
Organization of American States (“OAS”) special rapporteurs on
freedom of expression together with the Organization for Security and
Co-operation  in  Europe  (“OSCE”) Representative on Freedom of the
Media is also worth recalling:
Criminal defamation laws . . . are unnecessary to protect
reputations. The threat of criminal sanctions[,] imprisonment
and prohibitive fines . . . exerts a significant chilling effect on
freedom of expression which cannot be justified. Criminal
defamation laws are frequently abused, being used in cases
which do not involve the public interest and as a first, rather
44 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
20(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) A (Dec.   16,   1966)   (“Any   advocacy   of   national,   racial   or  
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.”); see also ARTICLE 19, THE CAMDEN PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND EQUALITY 10, n.3 (2009) (stating a definition of incitement that is based on
Article  20(2)  as  “refer[ring]  to  statements  about  national,  racial  or  religious  groups  which  create  
an  imminent  risk  of  discrimination,  hostility  or  violence”), and Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue,
& Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the Prohibition of Incitement to National,
Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 11 (Apr.
6–7, 2011) (endorsing   Principle   12   of   Article   19’s   Camden   Principles),  
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/JointSRsubmissionforNairobiworkshop.pdf.
45 Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance,
Implementation   of   General   Assembly   Resolution   60/251   of   15   March   2006   Entitled   “Human  
Rights Council,”   Human Rights Council, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/3 (Sept. 20, 2006) (by
Asma Jahangir and Doudou Diène).
46 Id. ¶ 49.
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than last resort. Criminal defamation laws should be
abolished and replaced with appropriate civil defamation
laws.47
The UN Human Rights Committee has consistently reaffirmed this
viewpoint, calling on states to decriminalize conventional defamation
laws and to cap the amount of possible damages awarded in civil
lawsuits.48
Allowing the OIC and others to conflate defamation of religion
with incitement to religious hostility is problematic for two related
reasons. First, under the conflated definition, states can use an
otherwise legitimate international norm to prosecute insults or
criticism directed at religious beliefs simply by applying a relaxed
interpretation   to   terms   such   as   “advocacy,”   “incitement”   and  
“hostility.”   Second, permitting a dilution of the stringent standards
associated with ICCPR Article 20(2) may have the effect of
cheapening the coin, which in turn may give rise to other states
disregarding their obligation to prohibit genuine advocacy of hostility
that actually constitutes incitement to imminent violence and leaves
more immediately threatening acts unchecked.
47 Santiago Canton, Freimut Duve, & Abid Hussain, Statement Regarding Key Issues and
Challenges
in
Freedom
of
Expression
(Mar.
7,
2000),
http://www.ifex.org/international/2000/03/07/report_on_key_issues_and_challenges. In the U.S.
context, one observer has remarked:
Criminal libel law . . . is a useless and increasingly unconstitutional remedy for the redress
of racial or ethnic group defamation. . . . Criminal defamation is not recognized in the Model
Penal Code or by a leading criminal law treatise. Even though racial and ethnic defamation
affect the public weal and not merely individual interests, the criminal law of libel is no longer
effective to redress that group wrong.
Michael J. Polelle, Racial and Ethnic Group Defamation: A Speech-Friendly Proposal, 23
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 213, 257–258 (2003).
48 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Russian Federation, ¶ 24(b),,UN Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 (Nov. 24, 2009) (noting
that  the  “State  party  should  . . . [d]ecriminali[z]e defamation and subject it only to civil lawsuits,
capping any damages awarded”); see also Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee: Mexico, ¶ 20(d), UN Doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (May 17, 2010)
(suggesting  that  the  State  party  should  “[t]ake  steps  to  decriminalize  defamation  in  all  states.”);
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: The Former
Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, ¶ 6, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MKD/CO/2 (Apr. 17, 2008) (noting
that   the   Committee   “welcomes   the   amendments   to   the Criminal Code, decriminalizing the
offence[] of defamation . . . as steps in the right direction towards ensuring freedom of opinion
and  expression  particularly  of  journalists  and  publishers”);;  Human  Rights  Comm.,   Concluding
observations of the Human Rights Committee: Italy, ¶ 19, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5 (Apr.
24,   2006)   (“The   State   party   should   ensure   that   defamation   is   no   longer   punishable   by  
imprisonment.”).  The  UN  Human  Rights  Committee’s  General Comment No. 34 reiterates this
position:  “States  parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation and, in any case,
the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases and
imprisonment  is  never  an  appropriate  penalty.”  Human  Rights  Comm.,   General Comment No.
34: Article 19: Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 47, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12,
2011).
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The need to more clearly delineate and preserve this bright line
distinction is even more pressing due to the nature of the compromise
struck in Resolution 16/18 and specifically the failure to
authoritatively repudiate the concept of defamation of religion. By
agreeing to shift the debate into a decidedly less confrontational space
made possible by vague terms open to subjective interpretation, the
United States and others may have complicated the task of identifying
and effectively confronting limitations on free expression and
freedom of religion or belief motivated by the desire to curb
perceived criticism or insult of religious beliefs. Indeed, while
achieving consensus may be laudable, moving into this mostly
untested gray zone seems particularly ill-advised given   the   OIC’s  
ongoing effort to graft defamation of religion onto the framework of
incitement, even at the expense of delegitimizing existing
international law.
II. RESOLUTION 16/18: ENDING A DECADE OF “DIVISIVE DEBATE”?
A. Resolution 16/18: Crafting a Consensus
On its surface, UNHRC   Resolution   16/18   on   “Combating  
Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and
Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against,
Persons Based on Religion or Belief”49 represents a turning point
insofar as it breaks the longstanding UNHRC practice of endorsing an
annual resolution explicitly decrying defamation of religions. The
resolution also ends a lengthy paper trail of mandated annual
reporting dedicated to defamation of religion produced by various UN
bodies. In place of this, the UNHRC, acting by consensus, agreed to
condemn   “any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility  or  violence,”  while  recognizing  
that   “interfaith   and   intercultural   dialogue . . . can be among the best
protections against religious intolerance and can play a positive role
in  strengthening  democracy  and  combating  religious  hatred.”50
To this end, the resolution sets out a number of concrete
suggestions   intended   “to   foster   a   domestic   environment   of   religious  
tolerance,   peace   and   respect”51 and to “promot[e]   the   ability   of  
members of all religious communities to manifest their religion, and
to contribute   openly   and   on   an   equal   footing   to   society.”52 For
49
50
51
52

Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, supra note 7.
Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6(b).
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example,   the   UNHRC   calls   on   states   to   “[s]peak[]   out   against  
intolerance, including advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination,   hostility   or   violence.”53 The resolution
also urges states to adopt, in accord with ICCPR Article 20(2),
“measures   to   criminalize incitement to imminent violence based on
religion   or   belief.”54 Lastly, the resolution serves—albeit
unofficially—as the departure point for what has come to be known
as   the   “Istanbul   Process,”   which   is   a   series   of   meetings   intended   to  
“spur  implementation  of  the  specific actions called for in Resolution
16/18”55 by,  among  other  things,  “sharing  best  practices.”56
B. Consensus? Yes. End to Defamation? No.
Based on the remarks of those states that continue to tout the
legitimacy of prohibiting defamation of religion, it is evident that the
putative norm is still very much alive and well, despite the new
consensus approach intended to supplant it. For example, addressing
the high level segment of the 16th Session of the UNHRC before it
passed Resolution 16/18, OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin
Ihsanoglu reiterated   his   call   for   “establishing an Observatory at the
Office of the High Commissioner to monitor acts of defamation of all
religions.”57 Ihsanoglu   lauded   the   OIC’s   flexibility in negotiations,
expressing   an   expectation   for   “some   reciprocity,”   and   asserted   that  
the   “perception that supporting [defamation of religion] would
throttle  one’s right to freedom [of] expression is only a myth.”58
Several weeks later, the ambassador from Pakistan, Zamir Akram,
articulated   the   OIC’s   view   more   bluntly   in   his   introductory   remarks  
immediately preceding UNHRC adoption of the resolution:
This draft resolution addresses a number of issues over which
the OIC has been expressing concern over the years. Having
Id. ¶ 5(e).
Id. ¶ 5(f). That threshold seems to align with American constitutional law and precludes
criminal sanctions for incitement to discrimination, hostility, or non-imminent violence. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curium) (noting that incitement is protected
speech unless the speaker calls for “imminent  lawless  action  and  is  likely  to  incite  or  produce  
such  action”).
55 U.S. Dep’t of State, The   “Istanbul   Process   for   Combating   Intolerance   and  
Discrimination   Based   on   Religion   or   Belief”   Implementing   Human   Rights   Council   (HRC)  
Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, HUMANRIGHTS.GOV, 2,
http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/20111204-Istanbul-Process.pdf (last
visited Mar. 16, 2012). The Istanbul Process is discussed at greater length in Part III.C infra.
56 Id.
57 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Sec’y Gen., OIC, Statement at the High Level Segment of the
16th Session of the Human Rights Council 9 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/9429hrc16sessionoic.pdf.
58 Id. at 10.
53
54
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said that, I want to state categorically that this resolution does
not   replace   the   OIC’s   earlier   resolutions   on   combatting  
defamation of religions which were adopted by the Human
Rights Council and continue to remain valid.59
Reinforcing this position, the Saudi Arabian ambassador in his
explanation before the vote observed that:
This text contains many positive points . . . . [However,] this
text . . . is not replacing the other existing text which also
criminalizes attack on religion. This text still remains valid
. . . [and events like the burning of the Koran in the United
States] calls on us all to redouble our efforts against this
phenomenon.60
Despite these pointed statements, U.S. Ambassador Eileen
Chamberlain Donahoe chose not to refute the assertion that an
international norm prohibiting defamation of religion remained
valid.61 Instead, she left it to the representative from Hungary to
politely demur:   “insofar   as   they   are   directed   at   the EU we do not
agree with the . . . allegations made by the distinguished Ambassador
of Pakistan in . . . his introduction  to  this  resolution.”62
59 Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pak. to the U.N. Office at Geneva,
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 24,
2011)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm?start=00:39:20&end=00:49:44. For video of the entire March 24, 2011 proceedings, see
U.N.,
15:00–18:00
46th
Plenary
Meeting,
http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110324#pm2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
Remarkably, this loaded statement received virtually no press coverage, netting only four hits
via  a  Google  search.  Search  Results  for  “state  categorically  that  this  resolution  does  not  replace  
the   OIC’s   earlier   resolutions   on   combatting   defamation   of religions,”   GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&safe=off&site=webhp&q=%22state+categorically+that+
this+resolution+does+not+replace+the+OIC’s+earlier+resolutions+on+combating+defamation+
of+religions%22&oq=%22state+categorically+that+this+resolution+does+not+replace+the+OI
C’s+earlier+resolutions+on+combating+defamation+of+religions%22 (last visited Mar. 16,
2012).
60 Ahmed Suleiman Ibrahim Alaquil, Saudi Arabia Ambassador to the Human Rights
Council, Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar.
24,
2011)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm?start=00:50:10&end=00:51:42.
61 See Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe, U.S. Ambassador to the Human Rights Council,
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 24,
2011),
available
at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm?start=00:54:04&end=00:58:47 (noting that the resolution only allows for punishment
when expression incites imminent violence, but not addressing   the   OIC   members’   claims   that  
the prior resolutions remained valid).
62 András Dékány, Permanent Representative of Hung. to the U.N. Office at Geneva,
Remarks at the 16th Session, 46th Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (March 24,
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Following its adoption by consensus, numerous officials and
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”)   lined   up   to applaud
Resolution 16/18 as a death knell for defamation of religion. The
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
(“USCIRF”),   long   critical   of   the   OIC’s   effort   to   install   a   norm  
prohibiting defamation of religion, offered an observation seemingly
disconnected   from   reality:   “Tragically,   it   took   the   assassinations   of  
two   prominent   Pakistani   officials   who   opposed   that   country’s  
draconian blasphemy laws . . . to convince the OIC that the annual
defamation of religions resolutions embolden extremists rather than
bolster   religious   harmony.”63 Likewise, Human Rights Watch
ventured that the shift to combating intolerance  “implicitly  rejects  the  
‘defamation  of  religions’  concept.”64
Oddly, neither of these statements sought to account for the
multiple   reassertions   of   the   norm’s   validity   expressed   during   the  
Council   session.   Perhaps   more   cautiously,   the   UN’s   Special  
Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belief, on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, and on Contemporary Forms of Racism
jointly declared   the   adoption   of   Resolution   16/18   a   “positive  
development.”65 During an Office of the High Commissioner for
Human   Rights   (“OHCHR”)-sponsored expert workshop in Nairobi,
Kenya,   they   expressed   their   collective   appreciation   that   “the  
[UNHRC] has—after years of debate—ultimately found a way to
unanimously address [the] worrying phenomena [of intolerance,
negative stereotyping, discrimination, and incitement] without
referring to concepts or notions that would undermine international
human  rights  law.”66 At the same time, however,  they  “emphasize[d]  
the principle that individuals rather than religions per se are the

2011),
available
at
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/conferences/unhrc/sixteenth/hrc110324pm2eng.rm?start=00:59:05&end=01:02:22 (speaking on behalf of the EU).
63 Press   Release,   U.S.   Comm’n   on   Int’l Religious Freedom, USCIRF Welcomes Move
Away   from   “Defamation   of   Religions”   Concept (Mar. 24, 2011), http://uscirf.gov/newsroom/press-releases/3570-uscirf-welcomes-move-away-from-defamation-of-religionsconcept.html.
64 UN: Rights Body Acts Decisively  on  Iran,  Cote  d’Ivoire, HUMAN R IGHTS WATCH (Mar.
25, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/25/un-rights-body-acts-decisively-iran-cote-divoire.   Human   Rights   Watch   attributed   particular   significance   to   the   fact   that   “the   new  
resolution was proposed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and adopted by
consensus.”  Id.
65 Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
8
(Apr.
6–7,
2011),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/JointSRsubmissionforNairobiworkshop.pdf.
66 Id.
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rights-holders.”67 These statements were reiterated by the special
rapporteurs in their joint submissions to the follow up OHCHR
workshops held in Bangkok, Thailand68 and Santiago, Chile during
2011.69
III. LIVING IN A POST-CONSENSUS WORLD: THE WEST DREAMS
WHILE THE OIC SCHEMES
Despite the general fanfare and congratulatory accolades
surrounding the consensus vote on Resolution 16/18, neither the
content of the resolution nor the remarks of state representatives at the
UNHRC offer anything that decisively invalidates or discredits the
recognition of an international prohibition on defamation of religion.
In fact, as the following sections indicate, despite the omission of the
term  “defamation  of  religion”  from  UN  resolutions  in  2011,  the  OIC  
continues to support this norm actively as a fait accompli. This
consistent position denigrates the spirit of consensus in which the
resolutions combatting intolerance ostensibly were passed. More
disturbingly, this behavior may ultimately undermine the very
objectives to which Resolution 16/18 aspires by condoning the
continued prosecution of blasphemy-based offenses and potentially
discrediting otherwise legitimate efforts to combat discrimination and
incitement.
A.  The  UN’s  Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  the  Elaboration  of  
Complementary Standards
Following   the   UNHRC’s   2006   decision,   the   Ad   Hoc   Committee  
on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards embarked on a series
of working sessions “to  draw  up  the  requisite  legal  instruments”70 that
would address existing gaps in the CERD and formulate new
67

Id.
Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
12
(July
6–7,
2011)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/expert_papers_Bangkok/
SRSubmissionBangkokWorkshop.pdf.
69 Heiner Bielefeldt, Frank La Rue, & Githu Muigai, OHCHR Expert Workshops on the
Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
10
(Oct.
12–13,
2011)
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Santiago/JointSRSubmissionSantia
go.pdf.
70 Human Rights Council Dec. 3/103, Global Efforts for the Total Elimination of Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Follow-Up
to the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance and the Effective Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action, ¶ (a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/3/103 (Apr. 23, 2007).
68
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normative standards aimed at combating incitement to racial and
religious hatred.71 As noted above, the OIC attempted to use this
venue to blur the line between defamation and incitement and press
for a new treaty prohibiting insults and ridicule of religion.72 In part
because of opposition to this approach, the meetings held from 2008
through 2010 were characterized by an overriding sense of discord
and contention so profound that the position of ChairpersonRapporteur remained vacant for an extended period.73 But what of the
Ad   Hoc   Committee’s   session   following   the   passage   of   Resolution  
16/18, which occurred in a new atmosphere of consensus that put
aside  the  previous  “false  divide that pits religious sensitivities against
freedom   of   expression”?74 The second part of the Ad Hoc
Committee’s   third   session,   which   convened   April   11–21, 2011, is
instructive in this regard.
After an abortive start to the third session and a delay of nearly six
months, member states reconvened and agreed that Jerry Matthews
Matjila, Permanent Representative of South Africa, would serve as
chairperson-rapporteur for the committee.75 In turn, Matjila proposed
four initial topics for discussion intended  to  reflect  “burning  issues  of  
the   times”   and   “key   topics   and   concerns   of   participants”:76 (1)
“xenophobia”;;  (2)  “incitement  to  racial,  ethnic  and  religious  hatred”;;  
(3)   “racial   and   xenophobic   acts   committed   through   information and
communication   technologies”;;   and   (4)   “racial,   ethnic   and   religious  
profiling.”77 Matjila suggested that the committee address incitement
to  racial,  ethnic  and  religious  hatred  specifically  because  it  “had  been
the focus of attention during recent sessions of the Human Rights
Council, [and] . . . the  Council’s  last  session  had  adopted  a  resolution  
by   consensus   and   that   he   wished   to   build   thereon.”78 The United
States expressed the view that any discussion in the Ad Hoc
Committee should reflect the new consensus language contained in
71 Id. ¶ (a). For additional background on the Ad Hoc Committee, see Ad Hoc Committee
on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/adhoccommittee.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
72 See supra Part I.B.
73 Human Rights Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of
Complementary Standards on its Third Session, ¶ 4, UN Doc. A/HRC/18/36 (Sept. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report].
74 Stephen Kaufman, Clinton Says More Effort Needed to Combat Religious Intolerance,
IIP
DIGITAL
(July
15,
2011),
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2011/07/20110715180740nehpets0.7188227.ht
ml#axzz1o12afMnj (quoting Secretary of State Hilary Clinton).
75 HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 73, ¶¶ 4, 6, 7.
76 Id. ¶ 15.
77 Id. ¶ 14.
78 Id. ¶ 16.
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Resolution   16/18,   namely   “combating   advocacy   of   national,   ethnic,  
religious and racial hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.”79 But other participants
disagreed, leaving the formal meetings bogged without consensus
over which issues the committee should in fact address.
In an attempt to overcome the impasse, the Ad Hoc Committee
adjourned   and   shifted   into   “informal   consultations”   facilitated   by  
Mothusi Bruce Rabasha Palai, the permanent representative of
Botswana.80 Following   these   efforts,   Palai   reported   back   that   “[i]n  
view of the need to keep the participants working together, topic 2
‘Advocacy and incitement to racial, ethnic, national and religious
hatred’   had   been   dropped.”81 According   to   Palai’s   report,   the   EU  
“seemed   to   have   major   difficulty   with   the   wording   of   the   topic’s  
title,”82 whereas the United States reiterated its concern as being
“more   one   of   characterization   than   of   reality   or   substance,”   and  
“suggested  that  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee move forward on the basis of
[the UNHRC] consensus resolution rather than revert to previous
terminology and focus.”83
Ultimately, the Ad Hoc Committee could only agree to move
forward on discussions relating to the topics of xenophobia and the
“[e]stablishment, designation or maintaining of national mechanisms
with competences to protect against and prevent all forms and
manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related   intolerance.”84 These discussions reveal a continuing
overarching procedural disagreement over whether perceived gaps in
normative standards require new treaties or protocols or can be
addressed within existing frameworks through more effective
implementation.85 Coupled with the obvious ongoing substantive
tensions alluded to above, these factors together may help explain
additional  delays  in  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee’s  scheduled  meetings  and  
anticipated work product.86 The  chairperson’s  plea  for  “other  regions  
Id. ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. ¶ 21.
81 Id. ¶ 23.
82 Id. ¶ 27.
83 Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis added).
84 Id. ¶ 63.
85 For example, the United States “expressed   the   need   for   practical   discussions that
focused on better implementation of existing norms, as the problem was not that there were gaps
in the existing international legal framework, but rather that there were gaps in practical
implementation  of  existing  standards.”  Id. ¶ 67. In contrast, the views of the OIC and the Africa
Group held that before addressing  national  mechanisms,  “new gaps required the elaboration of
new  standards”  and  “[n]ational  mechanisms  alone  could  not  fill  gaps  and  it  was  only  logical  to  
set  norms  first.”  Id. ¶¶ 71–72. This  underlying  dispute  led  the  EU  to  observe  that  “the  Ad  Hoc  
Committee appeared to be at a standstill again . . . .”  Id. ¶ 85.
86 The  Ad  Hoc  Committee’s  fourth  session  was  postponed  from  late  2011  to  April  2012.  
79
80
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to consider if they were now ready to take on the responsibility of
serving   as   Chairperson   of   the   Ad   Hoc   Committee” may also have a
role in the delay.87
The  UNHRC’s  review  of  Ad  Hoc  Committee’s  progress  provides  
additional   insight   into   the   status   of   the   “consensus”   reached   in  
Resolution 16/18. During a general debate addressing the Ad Hoc
Committee’s   third   report   held   in   September   2011,88 Pakistan, on
behalf of the OIC, explained that Resolution 16/18 was
an attempt by the OIC to build consensus on an issue of vital
importance . . . by identifying ways and means to deal with
the growing problem of religious intolerance and
discrimination, and incitement to hatred and violence based
on religion. However, as projected by some, it is important to
emphasize   that   resolution   16/18   did   not   replace   the   OIC’s  
earlier resolutions on combating defamation of religions
which were adopted by the Human Rights Council and
continue to remain valid.89
From  the  OIC’s  perspective,  then,  it  would  be  perfectly  legitimate  for  
the Ad Hoc Committee to consider and propose a new treaty or
protocol addressing defamation of religion in the context of
incitement to religious hatred. In support of this understanding, the
representative  from  Kuwait  reasoned  that  the  “constitution  of  the  state  
of Kuwait is in conformity with the rules and regulations of human
rights conventions”   and   thus,   “[l]egally,   it   is   not   allowed   to   express  
any opinion that includes scorn or that degrades or demeans any faith

Human Rights Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary
Standards on its Fourth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/78 (Dec. 1, 2011).
87 HRC Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 73, ¶ 108.
88 See Human Rights Council Holds General Debate on Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS
(Sept.
27,
2011),
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11441&LangID=E
(providing testimony in an unofficial form).
89 Saeed Sarwar, Draft Statement by Pakistan, on Behalf of the OIC Member States,
During General Debate Under Agenda Item 9 During the 18 th Session of the Human Rights
Council
(Geneva,
27
September
2011),
2,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/18thSession/OralStatements/
1%20Pakistan%20%28OIC%29%2031.pdf (password protected). Similar to remarks offered
before adoption of Resolution 16/18, the U.S. statement delivered during the general debate
does not contradict the OIC assertion concerning defamation of religion. See Emily Narkis,
Remarks Delivered on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of
Intolerance, Follow-Up and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action at the Human Rights Council 18th Session (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/18thSession/OralStatements/
5%20United%20States%2031.pdf (password protected).
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or religion . . . be it in challenging the beliefs or the teachings and
traditions. This applies [to] all religions without naming one
religion.”90 Likewise, the Moroccan delegate stressed the importance
of the Ad Hoc Committee’s  work  and  associated  its  own  position  with  
that of the OIC and Africa Group.91
B. OIC Resolutions and Other Activities
Despite the ostensible existence of a new consensus view on
incitement at the UN, delegates to the UNHRC cannot be faulted for
insisting on the continued legitimacy of defamation of religion within
in the Council and elsewhere. In reality, these government officials
are merely restating another consensus—yet contradictory—view
maintained  by  the  OIC  that  continues  to  “call  upon  the  international  
community to take effective measures to combat the defamation of
religions . . . .”92 Indeed, the   resolutions   emerging   from   the   OIC’s
most recent Council of Foreign Ministers—which followed months
after the unanimous UNHRC endorsement of Resolution 16/18—
plainly establish that securing a prohibition against defamation of
religion remains one   of   the   organization’s   overriding   objectives,  
despite  any  “historic”93 UN consensus relating to incitement.
For example, Resolution No. 34/38-POL On Combating
Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against Islam
generally   “[r]eaffirm[s]   all   OIC   resolutions,   which   stress,   inter alia,
the need for effectively combating defamation of Islam and
incitement to religious hatred, hostility, violence and discrimination
against Islam and Muslims, as well as the growing trend of
Islamophobia.”94 More specifically,   the   resolution   affirms   the   OIC’s  
commitment to securing a prohibition against defamation that applies
90 Haya Al-Duraie, Kuwait Ambassador to Human Rights Council, Remarks at 18th
Session, 31st Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/09/kuwait-item-9-general-debate-31st-plenarymeeting.html.
91 Omar Rabi, Morocco Ambassador to the Human Rights Council, Remarks at the 18th
Session, 31st Plenary Meeting of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/09/morocco-item-9-clustered-id-on-racism-30thplenary-meeting.html.
92 OIC, OIC Astana Declaration: Peace, Cooperation and Development, ¶ 16, O.I.C. Doc.
OIC/CFM-38/2011/ASTANA DEC/FINAL (June 30, 2011).
93 Suzan Johnson Cook, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Int’l Religious Freedom, Remarks:
Promoting Respect and Tolerance for International Religious Freedom (Sept. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/172232.htm.
94 OIC, On Combating Islamophobia and Eliminating Hatred and Prejudice Against
Islam, OIC Res. No. 34/38-POL, compiled in Resolutions on Political Affairs, at 75, O.I.C. Doc.
OIC/CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL (June 28–30, 2011) (emphasis removed) [hereinafter OIC Res.
34/38-POL]. The   resolution   expresses   “the   firm   determination   of   Member   States   to   continue  
their  effective  cooperation  and  close  consultations”  to  this  end.  Id. at 76, § 1.
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exclusively to so-called   “divine   religions”95 and categorically links
defamation with blasphemy   by   condemning   “all   blasphemous   acts  
against  Islamic  principles,  symbols  and  sacred  personalities”  and  “all  
abhorrent and irresponsible statements about Islam and its sacred
personalities.”96
The  resolution’s  provisions  notably  omit  any  consideration  of  the  
deleterious impact of existing anti-blasphemy measures in OIC
member states and elsewhere.97 But perhaps most starkly at odds with
the   fanfare   surrounding   the   UNHRC’s   consensus   on   combating  
incitement,  the  OIC  resolution  calls  upon  all  states  “to  prevent  any  . . .
defamation of Islam by incorporating legal and administrative
measures which render defamation   illegal   and   punishable   by   law.”98
Drawing   on   the   OIC’s   position   in   the   UNHRC   Ad   Hoc   Committee,  
the resolution  calls  for  “a  legally  binding  international  instrument  to  
prevent intolerance, discrimination, prejudice and hatred on the
grounds of religion, and defamation of religions . . . .”99
If  the  OIC’s  commitment  to  advancing  a  prohibition  on  defamation  
of religion still appears ambivalent or otherwise displaced by the
consensus vote at the UNHRC, Resolution 34/38-POL cements the
OIC’s   position   by   establishing an annual reporting requirement
intended   to   cover   “defamatory   acts   against   Islam   or   its   sacred  
personalities.”100 And it maintains the defamation issue as an item
agenda for the 39th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.101
Similarly, Resolution 35/38-POL, expressly addressing
“Combating Defamation of Religions” also reaffirms previous UN
resolutions on defamation of religion, and
[e]mphasiz[es] that the consistent pattern of safe passage of
the resolution, by a majority vote beyond OIC membership,
lends recognition and international legitimacy to the urgent
need to combat defamation of religions.102
To undergird this position, the OIC elsewhere calls for “the nonuse of the universality of human rights as a pretext to interfere in the
95

Id.
Id. § 5.
97 See infra Part IV.C (discussing numerous instances of anti-blasphemy laws being used
by OIC member states to infringe on freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief).
98 OIC Res. 34/38-POL, supra note 94, at 77, § 9.
99 Id. § 12 (quotations omitted). The resolution also established an   “open-ended
Intergovernmental Group of Legal an[d] Political Experts to develop and examine the legal and
political  elements  of  such  an  instrument.” Id. at 78, § 13.
100 Id. § 16.
101 Id. § 18.
102 OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL, supra note 11, at 79 (emphasis removed).
96
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states’   internal affairs and diminish their national sovereignty.”103
Together with this, the OIC also asserts that western states have a
responsibility  to  “ensure  full  respect  to  Islam  and  all  divine  religions”  
and must reject the use of “freedom of expression or press as a pretext
to   defame   religions.”104 Arguably, these assertions may reflect no
more than rhetorical declarations. Resolution 35/38-POL, however,
also mandates very practical steps for advancing efforts to secure a
prohibition against defamation by, among other things, intensifying
efforts to coordinate positions and broaden the support base in favor
of   defamation   resolutions   “including   through   . . . possibilities of
reciprocal   arrangements   with   other   groups   and   states.”105 The
resolution also recommends specific activities be undertaken by the
OIC Secretary General.106
This political and legal maneuvering in turn begs the question:
How does the OIC reconcile its business-as-usual marching orders
concerning an international prohibition on defamation of religion with
the consensus mandate espoused by Resolution 16/18 and celebrated
by government and NGO officials alike? To help answer this
question,   the   OIC’s   2011   resolutions   provide   two   critical   pieces   of  
information. First, the organization offers no more than a passing
acknowledgement of the so-called historic UNHRC resolution. And
even then, the reference is couched in classically tepid diplomatic
parlance  that  merely  takes  note  of  “the  adoption  by  consensus  of  the  
HRC   resolution   16/18.”107 But beyond this lukewarm endorsement,
the   OIC   more   tellingly   “[u]rges   all   Member   States   to   continue   to  
support the [defamation of religion] resolution on bloc . . . while
exploring alternative approaches, including the one contained in the
HRC   resolution   16/18.”108 From this perspective, the resolution
103 OIC, On Follow Up and Coordination of Work On Human Rights, OIC Res. No. 1/38Leg, compiled in Resolutions on Legal Affairs, at 4, § 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM38/2011/LEG/RES (June 28–30, 2011) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg]; see also OIC, On
Follow Up and Coordination of Work On Human Rights, OIC Res. No. 1/37-Leg, at 1, § 5,
compiled in Resolutions on Legal Affairs, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-37/2010/LEG/RES.FINAL
(May 18–20, 2010) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 1/37-Leg] (emphasis removed) (“Calls   for   the  
non-use of the universality of human rights as a pretext to interfere  in  the  states’  internal  affairs  
and  undermine  their  national  sovereignty.”).
104 OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg, supra note 103, at 4, § 8; see also id. at 5, § 10 (similarly
reaffirming “the  need  to  pursue,  as  a  matter  of  priority,  a  common policy aimed at preventing
defamation of Islam perpetrated under the pretext and justification of the freedom of expression
in particular through media and Internet”).
105 OIC Res. No. 35/38-POL, supra note 11, at 82, § 14.
106 Id. § 16.
107 Id. § 14. The  preamble  of  this  resolution  “[r]eaffirm[s]  the  OIC  sponsored  resolutions  
on combating defamation of religions adopted by the Human Rights Council and the United
Nations  General   Assembly”  and  then  “[a]lso  reaffirm[s]  the  OIC  sponsored  resolution  16/18.”
Id. at 79 (emphasis removed).
108 Id. at 82, § 15.
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ostensibly   responsible   for   putting   an   end   to   “divisive   debate”   at   the  
UN is no more than a distraction, an alternative approach to securing
the   OIC’s   unaffected top priority—an international prohibition
against speech deemed critical or insulting of Islam, or at the very
least, international validation for the continued prosecution of
blasphemy offenses at home.
That  this  objective  remains  a  “top  priority”  is  confirmed  not  only  
in the text of the OIC resolution on combating defamation of
religion,109 but  also  in  the  organization’s  steadfast  commitment  to  the  
subject even in the face of seemingly more urgent matters. For
example, a survey of issues addressed at the OIC Annual
Coordination Meeting held in September 2011, and illustrated in the
below table, indicates that defamation of religion received more
consideration than developments in Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, and
Iraq combined.110 In fact, the only issue that garnered more attention
than   defamation   was   the   OIC’s   perennial   concern   with the ArabIsraeli/Israeli-Palestinian conflict—an issue inextricably linked to the
organization’s  establishment in 1969.111

§ 17.
Final Communique of the Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the OIC Member States, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/ACM-2011/FC (Sept. 26, 2011) [hereinafter
OIC, Final Communique].
111 Ishtiaq Ahmad, The Organization of the Islamic Conference: From Ceremonial Politics
Towards Politicization?, in BEYOND REGIONALISM?: REGIONAL COOPERATION, REGIONALISM
AND REGIONALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 125, 125 (Cilja Harders & Matteo Legrenzi eds.,
2008).
109 Id.

110 OIC,
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Table: Issues Addressed by OIC Annual Coordination Meeting
Final Communiqué 2011
Rank
1

2
3
3
4
5
6
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

Issue
Arab-Israeli/Israeli-Palestinian
conflict
(express references only)
Defamation
of
religion,
Islamophobia, & incitement to
racial and religious hatred
Terrorism
UN reform (including OIC voting at
the UN relating expressly to, inter
112
alia, defamation of religion)
Nuclear
weapons/energy,
disarmament & non-proliferation
Jammu and Kashmir
Libya
Somalia
Kosovo
Azerbaijan
Cyprus
Iraq
Muslims in Greece
Sudan
Yemen
Djibouti
Afghanistan
Syrian crisis (Arab Spring)

Total # of Paragraphs
(Paragraph #s)
12 (¶¶ 5–11, 13–15, 45,
& 54)
10 (¶¶ 54–63)
6 (¶¶ 39–44)
6 (¶¶ 64–69)
5 (¶¶ 45–49)
4 (¶¶ 20–23)
4 (¶¶ 26–29)
2 (¶¶ 25 & 33)
2 (¶¶ 30–31)
1 (¶ 18)
1 (¶ 19)
1 (¶ 32)
1 (¶ 34)
1 (¶ 35)
1 (¶ 36)
1 (¶ 37)
1 (¶ 38)
1 (¶ 15)

This ranking indicates that UNHRC Resolution 16/18 failed to
persuade the OIC that defamation of religion needed to be shelved or
abandoned. An EU-sponsored review of the UNHRC that predates
adoption   of   Resolution   16/18   confirms   that   the   OIC’s   agenda  
priorities remain unchanged,   even   in   a   “post-consensus”   era.  
112 See also OIC, On Coordination and Voting Patterns of Member States at the United
Nations and Other International and Multilateral Fora, Res. No. 41/37-POL, compiled in
Resolutions on Political Issues, at 99, § 5, O.I.C. Doc. OIC/CFM-37/2010/POL/RES//FINAL
(May 18–20, 2010) [hereinafter OIC Res. No. 41/37-POL] (emphasis added) (“Calls  on  Member  
States to further enhance their [UN] cooperation and coordination, and adopt unified positions
and voting patterns . . . that advance the objectives and principles of the OIC and interests of the
Islamic world, including those that relate to combating Islamophobia, the defamation of
religions, and peaceful settlement  of  conflicts.”). The  2011  final  communiqué  “urge[s]  Member  
States to implement [this] Resolution . . . .”  OIC, Final Communique, supra note 110, ¶ 67.
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According   to   the   report,   “[a]lmost   all   of   the   OIC   resolutions   in  
regular sessions concern Israeli violations of human rights, or
defamation of religions.”113
In  addition  to  illuminating  the  OIC’s  top  priorities,  the  2011 Final
Communique   is   also   instructive   insofar   as   it   confirms   the   OIC’s  
framing of UNHRC Resolution 16/18 as merely a stepping-stone on
the path to an international prohibition of defamation of religion. The
Communique specifically lauds the OIC Groups in New York and
Geneva   for   placing   the   “crucial”   issue   of   “incitement   to   racial   and  
religious hatred, in particular, its contemporary manifestation—i.e.
the defamation of religions, at the top of the permanent agenda of the
General  Assembly  and  the  HRC.”114 The statement then proceeds to:
(1)  “emphasize[]  the  need  to  develop,  at  the  United  Nations,  including  
the Human Rights Council, a legally binding international instrument
to   promote   respect   for   all   religions”;;115 (2)   “stress[]   the   need   to  
prevent the abuse of freedom of expression and freedom of press for
insulting   Islam   and   other   divine   religions”;;116 and finally (3) urge
Member States to implement OIC Resolution 41/37-POL,117 which
stated their commitment to vote as a bloc at the UN on OIC
objectives,   “including those that relate to combating Islamophobia
[and] the defamation of religions . . . .”118
The significance of both the OIC drive in favor of bloc voting and
its impact on UN affairs is worth underscoring in the context of
Resolution 16/18 and any future action on the questions of incitement
and  defamation.  The  EU’s  2011  report  on  the  UNHRC  observes  that  
“the  Africa  Group  often  seems  to  be  working  in  conjunction  with  the  
OIC—and frequently OIC members will speak on behalf of the Africa
Group.   The   OIC’s   concerns   have   thus   been   dominating   the   HRC’s  
discussions  and   outcomes.”119 As an outgrowth of the pervasiveness
of ‘bloc  politics’  within the HRC, “moderate states in blocs opposing
the EU often find it more attractive to go along with the OIC or the
Africa Group or the NAM [Non Aligned Movement] than to resist the
peer   pressure   and   vote   with   the   EU.”120 More distressingly, the
113 The European Union and the Review of the Human Rights Council, EUR. PARL. DOC.
PE 433.870, at 13 (2011).
114 OIC, Final Communique, supra note 110, ¶ 54 (emphasis added).
115 Id. ¶ 59.
116 Id. ¶ 61.
117 Id. ¶ 67.
118 OIC Res. No. 41/37-POL, supra note 112, at 99, § 5.
119 EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 433.870, supra note 113, at 13. This phenomenon is confirmed by
the  Africa  Group’s  position  within  the  framework  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  Complementary  
Standards. See supra Part I.B.
120 Id. at 15.
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pattern of response to this bloc voting has been colored by a
“prevailing  view  . . . that  the  EU  should  avoid  ‘losing’  and  therefore  
should not run . . . resolutions that may not attract a consensus.”121 As
a consequence, the report finds that EU ambitions in the UNHRC
have been distinctly lowered. Rather than propose and pursue its own
resolutions,122 the EU approach is characterized by a shift away  “quite
considerably from its initial position”   in   favor   of   “‘going   for  
consensus.’”123 Although this tactic may generate the appearance of
unanimity   within   the   Council,   it   does   little   to   address   the   report’s  
underlying conclusion that consensus-seeking behavior may
ultimately   harm   “the   cause   of   promoting   and   protecting   human  
rights.”124 In this respect, Resolution 16/18 and its outgrowth is a case
in point.
C. The Istanbul Process for Combating Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Anyone for Jenga?
On the heels of  the  38th  session  of  the  OIC’s  Council  of  Foreign  
Ministers, the OIC and United States co-hosted in Istanbul, Turkey, a
high-level ministerial meeting intended to facilitate Resolution
16/18’s   implementation.   The   event,   which   gathered representatives
from key states and international organizations, ended with a feeble
joint   statement   “call[ing]   upon   all   relevant   stakeholders   throughout  
the world to take seriously the call for action set forth in Resolution
16/18.”125 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton separately remarked:
[T]ogether we have begun to overcome the false divide that
pits religious sensitivities against freedom of expression, and
we are pursuing a new approach based on concrete steps to
fight intolerance wherever it occurs. Under [Resolution
16/18], the international community is taking a strong stand

121 Id.

at 12–13. The report also noted:

The  EU’s  isolation  is  evident  in  the  voting  records  of  the  Human  Rights  Council.
While most resolutions in the HRC are approved by consensus, roll-call votes are
held on the most contentious issues. In the first fifteen regular sessions, there were a
total of 89 roll-call votes. In 64 of them (72%), EU member states were in the
minority.
Id. at 14.
122 Id. at 13.
123 Id. at 18.
124 Id.
125 Joint Statement on Combating Intolerance, Discrimination, and Violence Based on
Religion or Belief, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Jul. 15, 2011),
http://www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20110719041927244.html.
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for freedom of expression and worship, and against
discrimination and violence based upon religion or belief.126
To further advance this new approach, the United States
announced   the   “Istanbul   Process,”   a   series   of   expert   level   meetings  
intended  to   “operationalize[e]  the  text   of   HRC   Resolution   16/18   . . .
[and] turn our energies to seeking real and effective measures against
bigotry, discrimination, and violence on the basis of religion or belief
in the ways spelled out in Resolution 16/18, which are fully consistent
with  freedom  of  expression.”127
The first of these meetings was held behind closed doors over
three days in late December 2011 in Washington DC. The meeting
focused on the twin themes of identifying methods to better enforce
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion or belief and
exploring government strategies to engage religious minorities,
including religious and cultural awareness training for government
officials.128 Although not in attendance, OIC Secretary General
Ihsanoglu sent a message to the meeting participants, reiterating
verbatim the remarks he offered several months earlier in Istanbul:
The importance of the consensual adoption of [Resolution
16/18] cannot be overemphasized. . . .
....
Let   me   say   that   it   reaffirmed   OIC’s   credibility   as   well   as  
demonstrated ability to seek, promote and build consensus on
even the most sensitive of issues in contemporary
international relations. It clearly demonstrated that, as a
mature International Organization, OIC was not wedded to
either a particular title or the content of a resolution. We just
wanted to ensure that the actual matter of vital concern and
interest to OIC Member states was addressed.129

126 Clinton,
127 U.S.

at 2.

supra note 9.
Dep’t of State, Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, supra note 55,

128 Cook, supra note 13; see also Agenda, Istanbul Process For Combating Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Dec. 12–14, 2011 (on file with the author).
129 OIC Secretary General, Message to the Washington Meeting on the Istanbul Process
(Dec.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20111215123907595.html. This message is a repeat
of the one offered at the outset of the ministerial meeting held in Istanbul on July 15, 2011. See
OIC, Statement of HE Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the OIC Secretary General, at the
Ministerial Meeting, held on 15 July 2011 at the IRCICA in Istanbul-Turkey (July 19, 2011),
www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20110719042534728.html.
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It is difficult to reconcile this statement with those promulgated by
OIC representatives and others in the lead up to voting on Resolution
16/18. Yet more egregiously, when contextualized against the flurry
of OIC activity both internally and at the UN reasserting the
organization’s   commitment   to   securing   a   prohibition   against  
perceived criticism and insult of religious ideas and beliefs, the
Secretary   General’s   assertion   that   the   OIC   is   not   wed   to   content  
appears dubious at best.
For its part, the U.S. Department of State has announced its
intention   to   compile   “a   comprehensive   report   based   on   discussions  
[from the December meetings] outlining a set of recommendations
and best practices to be submitted to the [OHCHR] for public
distribution.”130 But confronted   with   the   OIC’s   seemingly  
contradictory positions, one must wonder what value such
recommendations will have in developing a genuinely consensual
vision for combating religious intolerance while upholding religious
freedom and freedom of expression. Indeed, the quest for concrete
implementation standards will likely prove to be a Jenga moment for
Resolution 16/18. By failing to decisively invalidate the chimera of
defamation of religion, the UN has allowed the OIC to advocate its
continued legality, including by openly asserting that implementation
of   Resolution   16/18   is   one   possible   “alternative approach”   to  
achieving the end goal of shielding religious beliefs from criticism
and insult. Against this backdrop, international negotiations aimed at
identifying implementation tools and practices will likely be subject
to significant pressure, particularly with respect to key terms
enshrined in Resolution 16/18.
Although international law does provide some guidance, such as
ICCPR Article 20, which suffers from underdeveloped consideration,
the ongoing activity of the UNHRC Ad Hoc Committee and the
OIC’s  unaltered  position  signal  the persistence of radically divergent
opinions. In this vein, discrepancies and nuances over parsing what
constitutes incitement, advocacy, discrimination, hostility, religious
hatred, denigration, negative religious stereotyping, and imminent
violence may generate three possible outcomes: (1) promulgated
international implementation standards that omit precise definitions
for key terms but retain consensus support; (2) a complete public
breakdown in negotiations or a contentious roll call vote on
implementation standards where consensus over specific terms cannot
be reached; or (3) the parties may opt in favor of death by committee,
130 U.S.

Dep’t of State, Resolution 16/18 December Expert Level Meeting, supra note 55,

at 2.
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where consensus over specific terms cannot be reached, resulting in
no public follow up by the UNHRC on implementation standards.
In the first scenario, national authorities are left to fill in the
blanks, allowing for operationalization of Resolution 16/18 that
facilitates subjective interpretation and measures that continue to
protect select religious beliefs at the expense of freedom of
expression and freedom of religion or belief. Here, the OIC will be
quick to point to its consistent understanding that while “human  rights  
are universal in nature,”   any   consideration   must   “bear[]   in   mind   the  
significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical,  cultural  and  religious  backgrounds.”131 In the second case,
where negotiations suffer a public   breakdown,   the   OIC’s   hand   is  
similarly strengthened insofar as its member states are left free to
invoke both consensus Resolution 16/18 and previous defamation of
religion resolutions as valid bases for redoubling efforts intended to
prohibit defamation of religion. A roll call vote on implementation
standards likewise leaves Resolution 16/18 intact and, given the
current makeup of the UNHRC, seems unlikely to endorse any norms
that contradict OIC objectives. Under the third scenario, the parties
may, in the spirit of consensus, “agree  to  disagree” and in turn opt to
bury international implementation standards rather than spark another
“divisive   debate.”   That outcome would similarly empower national
authorities to superimpose a subjective interpretation on Resolution
16/18, including a linkage between it and previous defamation of
religion resolutions. This linkage, in turn, would ostensibly validate
domestic measures limiting perceived criticism or insult of select
religious beliefs as comporting with international law.
IV. MOVING FORWARD
In November   2011,   the   UN’s   Third   Committee   approved   a
consensus resolution mostly mirroring UNHRC Resolution 16/18.132
Human   Rights   First   (“HRF”)   called   the   Third   Committee   text   “a  
decisive break from the polarizing focus in the past on defamation of
religions.”133 Speaking after its adoption, the representative from the
131 OIC Res. No. 1/38-Leg, supra note 103, at 4, § 1; see also OIC Res. No 1/37-Leg,
supra note 103, at 1 (recognizing the importance of promoting human rights while taking into
account various historical and cultural backgrounds).
132 Social, Humanitarian & Cultural—Third Committee Res. 66/69(b), U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/66/L.47/Rev.1 (Nov. 11, 2011). One notable distinction requires the Secretary-General to
prepare   “a   report   on   steps   taken by States to combat intolerance, negative stereotyping,
stigmatization, discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons, based on
religion  or  belief.” Id. at 5, § 10.
133 Press Release, Human Rights First, U.N. Third Committee Makes Decisive Break from
“Defamation   of   Religion” (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/11/15/u-n-
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United Arab Emirates (“UAE”),   on   behalf   of   the   OIC,   again  
emphasized that the resolution was inexorably linked to prior
resolutions addressing defamation of religion.134 Alongside this, the
most recent issue of OIC Journal affirmed for its readers that
incitement to religious hatred and defamation of religion are
indistinguishable: “Resolution 16/18 signifies an alternative and
consensual approach towards dealing  with  the  issue  of  ‘defamation  of  
religions’  or  incitement  to  hatred  on  religious  grounds  with  a  view  to  
addressing vital concerns of all parties on this important issue.”135
Despite   the   OIC’s   very   public   and   consistent   assertion   that  
defamation of religion   remains   valid   and   the   organization’s   express  
intent to continue advocating its formal adoption, the UNGA moved
to   adopt   the   Third   Committee’s   resolution   one   month   later   in  
December 2011, again without a vote.136 In an effort to counter
“commonly expressed   concerns”137 challenging the wisdom of the
UNGA vote and the unfolding Istanbul Process,138 HRF sought to

third-committee-makes-decisive-break-from-%E2%80%9Cdefamation-ofreligion%E2%80%9D/. HRF also heralded Resolution 16/18 as   a   fresh   start   which   “charted a
new  course”  by  focusing  on  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  individuals  rather  than  the  protection  
of abstract ideas and religions. Press Release, Human Rights First, U.N. General Assembly
Urged to Combat Intolerance, Respect Free Expression (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/10/21/u-n-general-assembly-urged-to-combatintolerance-respect-free-expression/.
134 See Press Release, General Assembly, Third Committee, Text Recommending
Adoption of Protocol to Child Rights Convention Establishing Communications Procedure for
Individual Complaints Approved by Third Committee; 13 Other Texts Approved on Such Issues
as Combating Religious Intolerance, Disabilities Convention, Human Rights Learning, Human
Rights Council Report, U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4029 (Nov. 15, 2011) (“[The   consensus]  
was a very positive development . . . which also complemented other General Assembly
resolutions.”).
135 ‘Istanbul   Process’   Continues:   UN   Resolution   16/18   Sets   on   an   Implementation  
Framework in Washington, OIC J., Sept.–Dec. 2011, at 48, 48.
136 G.A. Res. 66/167, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/167 (Dec. 19, 2011); see also Press Release,
General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts More Than 60 Resolutions Recommended by
Third Committee, Including Text Condemning Grave, Systematic Human Rights Violations in
Syria, U.N. Press Release GA/11198 (Dec. 19, 2011) (announcing the adoption of the
resolution); Resolutions: 66th Session, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/66/resolutions.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (listing resolutions
adopted by the 66th session of the General Assembly).
137 See Joëlle Fiss, U.N. Tackles Religious Intolerance Without Limiting Free Speech,
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2011/12/20/the-u-s-isnot-opening-the-door-to-limiting-freedom-of-speech/ (responding to certain concerns over the
U.N. resolution on combating religious intolerance).
138 Conservative critics have most vocally raised these concerns. See, e.g., Soeren Kern,
U.S., E.U. Spearhead Islamic Bid to Criminalize Free Speech, STONEGATE INST. (Jan. 6, 2012,
5:00 AM), http://www.stonegateinstitute.org/2734/criminalize-free-speech (criticizing the
Obama administration for giving the OIC political legitimacy); Joseph Klein, The Obama
Administration’s   Islamist   Whitewashing   Campaign, FRONTPAGEMAG.COM (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://frontpagemag.com/2011/12/21/the-obama-administrations-islamist-whitewashingcampaign/ (criticizing the Obama administration   for   submitting   to   the   OIC’s   wishes);;   Nina
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rebut   several   “myths”   related   to   U.S. engagement with Muslim
states.  One  of  these  myths,  according  to  HRF,  posits  that  if  “[t]he  
OIC has not abandoned the concept of defamation of religions . . .
why   bother   organizing   [the   Istanbul   Process]   if   its   agenda   hasn’t  
changed?”139 Acknowledging   that   defamation   of   religion   “has not
vanished  into  thin  air”  and  that  blasphemy laws “continue to abuse
human rights,”   HRF downplayed the sustained effort to preserve
defamation  of  religion’s  legitimacy  by  loosely  observing  that  “[a]t
the international level . . . certain leaders have not abandoned
reference to defamation of religions.”140 This casual assessment
neglects the scope   and   consistency   of   the   OIC’s   multiple  
statements and resolutions that followed on the heels of Resolution
16/18. Moreover, it recklessly ignores the immediate connection
that the OIC continues to draw between previous defamation of
religion resolutions and the consensus resolutions of 2011.
Ultimately,  HRF’s  “myth”  and  “reality”  misses  the  point.  While  it  
may be fair to question the practicality of dialogue, the larger concern
should be whether the Istanbul Process can realistically offer a
framework for progress given the potential for manipulation outlined
above, as well as the failure to decisively reject the defamation of
religion chimera. We ignore these shortcomings in the international
consensus at the peril of religious dissenters, religious minorities,
nonbelievers, artists, academics, journalists, and others who seek to
exercise their rights to free expression and freedom of religion in
accordance with existing international norms. It therefore behooves
governments and other communities concerned with the protection of
these rights to stop dutifully validating the consensus approach
without taking critical stock of the process to date. To facilitate this
undertaking, and in the context of the findings presented herein, the
author proposes some general suggestions below.
A. Resolve to Categorically Invalidate Defamation of Religion
Perhaps the single largest obstacle to genuine international
progress   toward   combatting   intolerance   is   the   UN’s   failure   to   reject  

Shea, A   Perverse   ‘Process’:   Hillary’s   Free-Speech Follies, N.Y. POST (Dec. 16, 2011, 10:15
PM) (calling   on   US   diplomats   to   stop   the   “Istanbul   Process”); see also Jonathan Turley,
Criminalizing Intolerance, Op-Ed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011.
139 Fiss, supra note 137.
140 Id. Fiss  goes  on  to  suggest  that  “[t]his  requires  continued  vigilance  on  the  part  of  the  US  
and like-minded governments, as well as human rights and other civil society groups, to ensure
that the momentum remains on the side of the new consensus approach.”  Id.
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decisively the concept of defamation of religion. This failure ensures
that the idea remains an albatross to any parallel or consensus
process. This is particularly true when certain states, most notably
OIC members, continue to invoke prior UN resolutions on this topic
unchallenged as valid normative standards for protecting select
religious beliefs. This overarching problem is exacerbated by the
decision to sidestep the stark confrontation over defamation of
religion in favor of an approach premised on inadequately defined
norms that provide a sufficiently vague platform for achieving
consensus. The new consensus approach has effectively shut down
the debate over an underlying and unresolved fundamental dispute.
And it has effectively moved the debate to an area where states are
poised to reformulate the same insidious practices under the guise of
the decidedly more admirable objective of combatting intolerance.
Pressing the international community to implement norms for
combatting intolerance under these circumstances potentially risks
accommodating the same goals sought by defamation of religion.
More troubling, the consensus approach complicates the task of
identifying problematic practices because it shifts the debate from one
characterized by distinct bright lines to a more nuanced and
subjective framework that leaves greater maneuvering room for
justifying discrimination and limitations of rights. This loss of clarity
is problematic not only from a rights perspective, but from an
engagement perspective as well. Saying that international law
prohibits protecting religious beliefs from insult is a more
straightforward proposition than saying international law rejects a
national legislature or judiciary’s   interpretation   of   what   constitutes  
incitement, or for that matter, imminent violence. Thus, identifying
and countering instances of abusive implementation of measures
intended to combat intolerance becomes decidedly more complicated.
This potential fallout underscores why the Istanbul Process augurs
such little promise and in fact may further facilitate human rights
abuses.
To counteract this deleterious path, progress on the Istanbul
Process must be monitored closely. Discussions regarding the scope
of freedom of expression and other fundamental rights necessarily
dictate transparency.141 At a minimum, this requires opening future
proceedings to outside participation and scrutiny from NGOs,
journalists, academics and other concerned parties. Based on
141 Recall  that  the  Washington  DC  round  of  the  Istanbul  Process  was  “closed-door.”  Josef  
Kuhn, ‘The  Istanbul  Process’:  Hillary  Clinton  Hosts  Summit  on  Religious  Intolerance,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
15,
2011,
9:29
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/15/istanbul-process-clinton_n_1152508.html.
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whatever progress may be achieved for identifying means of
implementing Resolution 16/18 through the Istanbul Process, any
future UN resolution enshrining such norms should include operative
language clearly invalidating previous defamation of religion
resolutions as well as any other attempts to introduce similar norms
intended to shield religious beliefs from criticism.142 Admittedly, the
extent to which this is a feasible option is certainly open to debate.
Nevertheless, rejection of the defamation of religion concept must be
a prerequisite to any further advancement because it affords the only
authoritative means by which the specter of defamation of religion
can be prevented from contaminating genuine efforts aimed at
combatting incitement.143 To this end, there are several steps that can
be taken that build on earlier successes in lowering the numerical
majority voting in favor of defamation of religion resolutions.
B. Assertive Engagement on Constitutional and Legislative Reform
The Arab Spring revolutions can figure prominently in engaging
individual OIC member states. While many of these new
governments are emerging as decidedly Islamic in orientation, they
are also entering a world where human rights commitments are
increasingly important. Any extension of diplomatic and political
support and recognition, trade benefits, and aid (in the form of
financial and other assistance) should require the endorsement and
adoption of international human rights standards, not only in new
constitutions, but also in legislative reform that the post-revolution
era necessitates. Therefore, in addition to monitoring constitutional
and legislative change in countries in transition, the international
community should create opportunities for concrete engagement,
particularly regarding how these new governments intend to address
the challenge of combatting intolerance, as well as enshrine and
uphold international human rights.
142 As this Article goes to press, no progress on agreed implementation norms has been
made.   Instead,   the   UNHRC’s   nineteenth   session   in   March   2012   approved   by   consensus   a  
resolution on combating intolerance that reiterates almost verbatim Resolution 16/18, without
any supplemental reference to implementation. Human Rights Council Res. 19/…, Combating
Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to
Violence and Violence Against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief, 19th Sess., Mar. 23, 2012,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/L.7 (Mar. 16, 2012).
143 There is at least one precedent at the UN concerning revocation of previous resolutions.
Consider the 1991 UNGA decision to cancel its infamous Resolution 3379 from sixteen years
earlier, which purported to brand Zionism a form of racism and racial discrimination. The oneline   resolution   simply   provided   that   the   UNGA   “[d]ecides to revoke the determination
contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.”   G.A.   Res.   46/86,   U.N.   Doc.  
A/RES/46/86 (Dec. 16, 1991). Arguably, a more explicit rejection of the defamation of religion
norm that provides additional context and justification could be negotiated.
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International recognition of these new governments and
endorsements of legitimacy should not be extended as a matter of
course.   A   useful   starting   point   is   the   EU’s   decision   to   condition  
diplomatic recognition of post-Soviet states inter alia on the provision
of  legal  “guarantees  for  the  rights  of  ethnic  and  national  groups  and  
minorities”144 Yet, already the international community appears
poised to place inadequate emphasis on the importance of
concretizing rights in emerging constitutional texts.145 For example,
Libya’s   Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage,
provides   that   “Islam is the Religion of the State and the principal
source of legislation is Islamic   Jurisprudence  (Sharia).”146 While the
maintenance of an established state religion is not per se incompatible
with international human rights law, such official recognition must
not   result   in   any   impairment   of   recognized   rights,   ‘‘nor   in   any  
discrimination against adherents to other religions or nonbelievers.”147 With this in mind, the text fails to elaborate on key
questions including whose interpretation of sharia shall govern during
the transitional period, to whom shall sharia be applied, or what will
occur in the event of conflicts between sharia and international law.
To   this   end,   Article   7,   which   provides   that   “[h]uman   rights   and   his  
basic freedoms shall be respected . . . . [and that] [t]he state shall
endeavor to join the international and regional declarations and
charters which  protect  such  rights  and  freedoms,”148 leaves significant
room for improvement.
Similarly, statements of western officials do not go far enough in
establishing a minimum expectation for enshrining international
144 European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States, 31 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1485, 1487 (1992).
145 One comparative constitutional scholar recently writing about the unfolding drafting
process omitted any mention of an international role in the process or the importance of
incorporating strong protection for fundamental human rights. Tom Ginsburg, Libya’s   New  
Constitution:  Lessons  from  Iraq’s  Missteps, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2011. Earlier observations by
Ginsburg gloss over the issue of rights and focus instead on governance structure. See Tom
Ginsburg,
Thoughts
on
the
Draft
Transitional
Constitution
for
Libya,
CONSTITUTIONMAKING.ORG
(Aug.
21,
2011,
9:23
AM),
http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2011/08/thoughts-on-draft-transitional.html
(discussing the importance of governance structure); see also Catherine Ashton, EU High
Representative   for   Foreign   Affairs   and   Sec’y   Policy   and   Vice   President   of   the   European  
Comm’n,   Speech at the Libya Women’s Rights Forum (Nov. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/article_11579_fr.htm (emphasizing the importance of
political rights for women).
146 The   Transitional   Nat’l   Council   of   Libya,   Draft Constitutional Charter for the
Transitional Stage, AL-BAB.COM, art. 1, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/libya/Libya-DraftConstitutional-Charter-for-the-Transitional-Stage.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
147 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: Article 18: The Right to Freedom of
Thought, Conscience and Religion, ¶ 9, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Jul. 30, 1993).
148 Draft Constitutional Charter, supra note 146, at art. 7.
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human rights norms in emerging constitutions and state practice. For
example,  in  July  2011  Secretary  of  State  Clinton  said,  “In  Egypt  and  
Tunisia, we hope to see minorities brought into the process of drafting
a new constitution and given a seat at the table as new democracies
take  shape.”149 This timid stance is meager support for those favoring
reforms in line with international human rights norms, and does
precious little to motivate other relevant actors to forgo advocacy of
illegitimate limits on freedom of expression, including support for a
prohibition   on   “defamation   of   religions”.150 Indeed, several months
later, Egypt’s   constitution   drafting   committee   is   in   disarray,   faced  
with charges that some Islamists have sought to hamper the voices of
more moderate Egyptian Muslims, Coptic Christians, and secularists,
among others. Following a walkout by over 20 committee delegates
representative of these minority groups, an administrative court
moved to suspend the 100-member committee pending a review of
the process surrounding its formation.151
Building on the   EU’s   post-Cold War approach, therefore, the
international  community  should  be  prepared  to  “up  the  ante”.  It  must  
develop a diplomatic strategy that moves beyond previously accepted
constraints on engagement in a transparent and straightforward
manner. As recent case studies, Afghanistan and Iraq offer scant
evidence   to   support   perpetuating   the   “hands   off”   approach   that  
prevailed in those constitutional drafting experiences.152 Nevertheless,
149 Clinton,

supra note 9.
Tunisia: Affirm Human Rights in New Constitution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct.
20, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/19/tunisia-affirm-human-rights-new-constitution
(noting that a questionnaire that surveyed Tunisian political parties found that those parties
“disagree on limits to freedom of expression when it concerns the right to privacy, the
protection of minorities against hate speech, and  the  “‘defamation  of  religions’”).
151 Bradley Hope, Egyptian constitution committee suspended, THE NATIONAL (Abu
Dhabi), Apr 11, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/egyptian-constitutioncommittee-suspended. See also Zvi   Bar’el,   Muslim Brotherhood suffers blow as Egypt court
anulls constitutional panel HA’ARETZ, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-suffers-blow-as-egypt-court-anulls-constitutional-panel-1.423595.
152 On Afghanistan, see for example United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom, Afghanistan: Draft Constitution Could Codify Repression, Apr. 17, 2003,
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1477 (observing   “There
is no clear evidence that the United States has been sufficiently involved in [Afghanistan’s]
constitution-drafting process to ensure that universal human rights are guaranteed. Through a
contractor, U.S. assistance has concentrated on providing technical and logistical support for the
drafting committee and assistance in the public consultation process.”),  Mir  Hermatullah  Sadat,  
The Implementation of Constitutional Human Rights in Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 11,
no.
2
(2004):
48–50,
back
page,
available
at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/11/3sadat.pdf?rd=1 (noting   that   “the   international  
community and the UN have been generally ineffective in promoting human rights in
Afghanistan. The UN has been non-committal because its main agency, United Nations
Assistance  Mission  in  Afghanistan  (UNAMA),  wants  to  maintain  a  ‘light  footprint’  presence  in  
Afghanistan”),   and   Cornelia   Schneider,   The International Community   and   Afghanistan’s  
Constitution, 7 PEACE, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL (July
150 See
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some experts continue to endorse precisely this approach, calling for
limiting engagement on constitution drafting to generic efforts such as
“communicat[ing]   that   rule   of   law   works”   and   “offer[ing]   fair  
technical   help.”153 A new international strategy should draw a
principled and valid distinction between the dubious imposition of a
constitution on a sovereign state and the legitimate active and
assertive promotion of the inclusion of strong, internationally
recognized human rights safeguards in any new constitutional text.
The international community can use a range of diplomatic,
development, trade, and even military assistance incentives to this
end, including direct support for those political associations that favor
adopting international human rights norms as part of their political
platforms. Admittedly, a positive outcome for this more aggressive
engagement effort is by no means assured. This reality is underscored
by the decision of Egyptian authorities to prosecute a number of
prominent quasi-NGOs154 working in the rule of law and democracybuilding sectors for funding and supporting anti-government
protests.155 Nevertheless, supporting such efforts and reinforcing them
with parallel, meaningful backup by concerned governments will at
least facilitate the exposure of fault lines where they may exist, thus

2005), 174, 187, available at http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk (noting that Barnett R.
Rubin, a prominent consultant   to   Afghanistan’s   Constitutional   Drafting   Commission,   “in   his  
presentations to the Commission…appeared   to   be   treading   very   carefully   so   as   not   to   be  
perceived  as  interfering  with  the  process.  He  made  a  few  general  suggestions…”).  On  Iraq,  see  
for example J Alexander Their, Writing   Iraq’s   constitution   a   chance   to   change   history, SAN
FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE,
Feb.
25,
2005,
B–9,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/02/25/EDGJJBG1IT1.DTL&ao=all (making no mention of a role for
international  norms  or  human  rights  in  Iraq’s  new  constitution),  and  Constitution Fight in Iraq,
PBS Newshour, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/julydec05/iraq_8-29.html (according to Spence Spencer, Washington director of the Public
International   Law   and   Policy   Group,   “I   can   speak   from   my   own   experience   [in   Iraq]   that   we  
were very strongly cautioned to make sure that the technical assistance that we provided was
good and technical only and to leave the drafting and the decision-making to the Iraqis
themselves.”)
153 Nathan J. Brown, Americans, Put Away Your Quills, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT’L PEACE (Nov. 8, 2011), http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=45951. See also
Ginsburg, supra note 145.
154 These groups include the U.S. based International Republican Institute (“IRI”) and
National Democratic Institute (“NDI”), and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation based in
Germany. According to the IRI,   criminal   prosecution   of   its   staff   represents   “a   politically  
motivated  effort  to  squash  Egypt’s  growing civil society groups, orchestrated through the courts,
in part by Mubarak-era   hold   overs.”   IRI Statement on Rumored Prosecution of Americans in
Egypt, INT’L REPUBLICAN INST. (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.iri.org/news-events-presscenter/news/iri-statement-rumored-prosecution-americans-egypt.
155 See Scott Shane & Ron Nixon, Charges Against U.S.-Aided Groups Come with History
of Distrust in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES,   Feb.   7,   2012,   at   A6   (discussing   Egypt’s   prosecution   of  
nonprofit organizations).
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clarifying to what extent emerging governments are genuinely
prepared to adopt and abide by international norms.
C. Redouble Diplomacy: Identifying State Practices Inconsistent with
Consensus Resolution 16/18 and the Ongoing Problem with
Blasphemy Prosecutions
Concerned parties should redouble their public and private
diplomatic initiatives targeting states that have previously abstained
from or voted in favor of defamation of religion resolutions.
Informational outreach campaigns should identify state practices
inconsistent with Resolution 16/18 norms as well as the ongoing
deleterious impact associated with prosecution of blasphemy or
defamation of religion offenses. These outreach efforts can also
incorporate examples of best practices that highlight protection of
religious freedom while simultaneously upholding freedom of
expression.156 Developing these examples can help concretize the
risks associated with condoning a loose interpretation of standards
and norms associated with combating intolerance or authorizing an
international norm upholding defamation of religion.
Despite the 2011 consensus, a meaningful reduction in subjective
and discriminatory prosecutions of expression premised on protecting
religious beliefs is difficult to discern. For example, consider the
Tunisian   government’s   decision   to   prosecute   Nabil Karoui, the
director of satellite broadcaster Nessma TV, for airing Persepolis, an
animated film that includes a brief representation of god as imagined
from  a  child’s  point  of  view.157 Under the press and criminal codes of
l’ancien  regime, Karoui has been charged with insulting a recognized
religion158 and harming public order and good morals159—offenses
that carry a maximum jail term of between two to five years. Several
days   after   the   film’s   screening,   which   apparently attracted only 1
percent of the TV-viewing audience160 but was nevertheless described
by some as a provocation,161 suspected   “Salafist   activists”   allegedly
156 Some

of examples of steps that can be taken to this end are discussed in Part IV.D infra.
Franco-Iranian production directed by graphic novelist Marjane Satrapi
contemplates the 1979 Islamic revolution and rule of Ayatollah Khomeini through the eyes of a
young girl.
158 Art. 48, Republique Tunisienne, CODE DE LA PRESSE, Imprimerie Officielle de la
République Tunisenne, 2010.
159 Art. 121(3), Republique Tunisienne, LE CODE PENAL, Imprimerie Officielle de la
République Tunisenne, 2011.
160 Thierry Brésillon, Tunisie: Nessma TV, Symbole Ambigu pour un Procès Test, RUE 89
(Jan. 23, 2012, 7:25 AM), http://blogs.rue89.com/tunisie-libre/2012/01/23/tunisie-nessma-tvsymbole-ambigu-pour-un-proces-test-226346.
161 See Anthony Shadid, Tunisia Faces a Balancing Act of Democracy and Religion, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, at A1 (describing Salafist activists viewing the film as a provocation).
157 The
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firebombed   Karoui’s   home.162 The trial itself has been postponed
from November 2011 to January 2012, and most recently was
rescheduled to April 2012. On the street outside a Tunis courthouse
during   the   January   hearing,   a   “group of bearded young radicals
shouted[,]  ‘The people  want  Nessma  closed  down’  and  ‘You, media
cowards,   know   that   religion   mustn’t be defamed.’”163 Although not
known for antagonizing deposed President Ben Ali, Karoui has
argued  the  case  is  “a  test  for  freedom  of  expression  and  democracy  in  
Tunisia.”164
L’affaire   Persepolis, as it has come to be known, illustrates the
risks associated with enforcing offenses based on insult to religion or
vague terms open to subjective enforcement. In a country that Human
Rights   Watch   labeled   “best placed to move forward”165 among the
states undergoing Arab Spring revolutions, the prosecution may also
signal a potential rollback of (admittedly select) rights from the
previous regime. Ironically, the previous regime authorized screening
of the film in Tunisian theaters, and even contributed towards funding
a Tunisian dialect translation for local audiences.166 While Human
Rights  Watch  describes  Tunisia’s  new  Press  Code—drafted after the
revolution but not yet in force—as   “significantly   more   liberal,”   the  
legislation maintains defaming state-recognized religions as a
criminal offense,167 an approach that, on its face, stands at odds with
the 2011 consensus.
Egypt also augurs poorly as a bellwether for compliance with the
UNHRC’s   2011   consensus   resolution.   In   one   incident,   billionaire  
Egyptian Coptic Naguib Sawiris tweeted a caricature of Mickey
Mouse with a beard and Minnie Mouse in what was interpreted to be
conservative Islamic garb. Instead of the Walt Disney Company suing
162 Tunisia   Must   Drop   Charges   Against   TV   Boss   over   ‘Persepolis’   Screening, AMNESTY
INT’L (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/fr/node/29264.
163 Trial   of   Tunisian   TV   Chief   Who   Aired   ‘Persepolis’   Postponed,
FR. 24,
http://www.france24.com/en/20120123-trial-tunisian-television-chief-postponed-nessma-tvnabil-karoui-persepolis-april-19-adjourned (last updated Jan. 23, 2012).
164 Le   Procès   de   L’affaire   Persepolis   Reprend   à   Tunis, LA NOUVELLE TRIB. (Jan. 23,
2012), http://www.lnt.ma/actualites/le-proces-de-laffaire-persepolis-reprend-a-tunis-23815.html
(“[C]e  sera  un  test  pour  la  liberté  d’expression  et  la  démocratie  en  Tunisie.”).
165 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: EVENTS OF 2011, at 10 (2012).
166 Ulysse Gosset, Nébil  Karoui:  “En  Tunisie, Je  Suis  Dans  la  Peau  de  Salman  Rushdie”,
L’EXPRESS (Jan. 23, 2012, 3:13 PM), http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/nebilkaroui-en-tunisie-je-suis-dans-la-peau-de-salman-rushdie_1074321.html.
167 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 165, at 636. In another recent case, a Tunisian
court   sentenced   two   individuals   (one   in   absentia)   to   seven   years   in   prison   “for   violation   of  
morality,   and   disturbing   public   order”   after   they   posted   depictions   of   a   naked   prophet  
Mohammed to Facebook. Tarek Amara, Tunisians jailed for Facebook cartoons of Prophet,
REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-tunisia-facebookidUSBRE8341FO20120405.
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for   copyright   infringement,   he   was   hauled   before   Egypt’s   chief  
prosecutor and two separate charges of defamation of Islam were
filed against him.168 Although the courts did not address the
legitimacy of a criminal offense grounded in protecting select
religious beliefs from perceived insult, both charges were dismissed
for lack of standing.169 Other defendants have been less fortunate. In
February 2012, an Egyptian criminal court convicted septuagenarian
comic actor Adel Imam for  “defaming  Islam”   based on his role in a
2007 film.170 In another defamation case, an Egyptian juvenile court
sentenced a 17-year-old Christian student, Gamal Abdou Massoud, to
a three-year   jail   term   “after   he   insulted   Islam   and   published   and  
distributed pictures  that  insulted  Islam  and  its  Prophet.”171
In Indonesia, another state that voted in favor of the consensus
resolution of 2011, the Constitutional   Court   “upheld   the   country’s
[1965] anti-blasphemy law . . . which imposes criminal penalties of
up   to  five   years’   imprisonment on individuals who deviate from the
basic teachings of the official religions.”172 As the Special Rapporteur
on Religious Freedom observed, this ruling evidenced   “resistance   to  
abandoning the criminalization of blasphemy or to repealing
discriminatory   provisions   that   purport   to   combat   ‘defamation   of  
religions.’”173
The provision continues to be enforced, even in a post-consensus
era. Most recently, police arrested an Indonesian civil servant for
creating a Facebook page in support of atheism.174 After being held in
detention for over two months, Alexander Aan was indicted in April
168 Egypt Businessman Naguib Sawiris Faces Blasphemy Trial, BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16473759.
169 Egypt court dismisses Sawiris insulting Islam case, BBC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192283; Court dismisses Islam insult
case
against
tycoon
Sawiris,
EGYPT
INDEPENDENT,
Mar.
3,
2012,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/court-dismisses-islam-insult-case-against-tycoonsawiris.
170 Adel Imam is Sentenced to Jail over Islam Insult, BBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-16858553. The actor was sentenced to three
months and his appeal is still before the court. Adel  Imam’s  appeal  against  contempt  of  religion  
jail
sentence
adjourned,
EGYPT
INDEPENDENT
(Apr.
4,
2012),
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/adel-imams-appeal-against-contempt-religion-jailsentence-adjourned.
171 Egypt sends Christian student to jail for insulting Islam, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 2012,
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE83309420120404.
172 Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Interim Report on Elimination of
all Forms of Religious Intolerance, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 44, n.42,
UN Doc. A/65/207 (Jul. 29, 2010) (by Asma Jahangir).
173 Id. ¶ 44.
174 Syofiardi Bachyul Jb, Atheist Civil Servant Arrested for Blasphemy, JAKARTA POST
(Jan. 20, 2012, 6:02 PM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/20/atheist-civil-servantarrested-blasphemy.html.
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2012 under Criminal Code articles 156a(a) and 156a(b)175 for
allegedly deliberately expressing feelings “which  principally  have  the  
character of being at enimity [sic] with, abusing or staining a religion,
adhered   to   in   Indonesia”   and   intentionally   “prevent[ing]   a   person   to  
adhere to any religion based on the belief of the allmighty [sic]
God.”176 The offense carries a maximum imprisonment term of five
years.
The climate for religious intolerance in Indonesia is particularly
problematic for atheists, among others,177 given   that   the   republic’s  
constitution  provides  that  the  “State  shall  be  based  upon the belief in
the  One  and  Only  God.”178 As the United States Department of State
bluntly  observed,  the  Indonesian  “government  does  not  allow  for  not  
believing   in   God.”179 Plainly, this constitutional mandate appears at
odds with the 2011 UN consensus calling  on  states  to  “foster  religious  
freedom and pluralism by promoting the ability of members of all
religious communities to manifest their religion, and to contribute
openly   and   on   an  equal  footing   to   society.”180 The provision instead
indicates an approach based on the desire to punish expression that is
perceived as critical, insulting or even disbelieving of religion.
Individuals critical of Islam fare no better in the Palestinian
Authority   (“PA”)   governed   West   Bank,   where   international   donors  
play a central role in the development of Palestinian state institutions.
PA forces arrested Waleed Al-Husseini after a sting operation
identified him as responsible for Facebook and blog postings
allegedly defaming Islam.181 Security sources maintained it was
impossible to release Al-Husseini, a Muslim who had renounced his
faith in favor of atheism,   “because  [they   were]  afraid   he   w[ould]   be  
killed by his family.”182 Ultimately, Al-Husseini was given a three175 Atheist faces three counts in court, THE JAKARTA POST,
Apr. 2, 2012,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/02/atheist-faces-three-counts-court.html.
176 PENAL
CODE
OF
INDON.
arts.
156–56(a),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ffbcee24.html.
177 Indonesia’s   “Ministry of Religious Affairs extends official status to six religious
groups:   Islam,   Catholicism,   Protestantism,   Buddhism,   Hinduism,   and   Confucianism.” U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: INDON. 4 (July–December
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171653.pdf. The criminal code
includes  provisions  that  forbid  “staining  a  religion”  and  preventing  “a  person  to  adhere  to  any
religion  based  on  the  belief  of  the  almighty  God.”  INDON. PENAL CODE art. 156(a)(a–b).
179 INDON. CONST. art. 29(1).
179 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 177, at 4.
180 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, supra note 7, at 3, § 6(b).
181 Palestinian Jailed for   Logging   on   to   Facebook   as   ‘God’   to   Criticize   Islam,
HAARETZ.COM
(Nov.
12,
2010,
10:00
AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/palestinian-jailed-for-logging-on-to-facebook-asgod-to-criticize-islam-1.324302.
182 ‘Atheist’  Palestinian  Jailed  ‘for  His  Own  Safety’, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 7,
2010),
http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-technology/atheist-palestinian-jailed-for-his-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2040812

4/19/2012 1:07:09 PM

390

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

year suspended sentence after being detained for a total of nine
months, much of which was spent in jail without charge.183 Since his
release, security agents have on several occasions arrested and
allegedly beaten Al-Husseini with cables, destroyed his two
computers,   and   “demanded   that   he   stop   expressing   his   views.”184
Another man from the same West Bank city of Qalqilya faces a
similar charge after being arrested by police following an altercation
with   his   father.   According   to   the   police   report,   “the   father   called  
police   to   break   up   the   fight   after   his   son   ‘cursed   God.’”185 When
asked   about   the   case,   Qalqilya’s   deputy   police   chief   asserted   that  
police   would   target   anyone   who   “curses   God   or   any   prophets   or  
religions.”186
The Palestinian Authority is still not a voting member of the UN
and admittedly did not have a say in the 2011 consensus vote. But
police officials volunteering this   type   of   “mission   statement”   is  
particularly troubling considering the ongoing role played by
international actors including the United States in funding and
training Palestinian police forces in subjects that include the rule of
law and human rights.187 Indeed, this approach to law enforcement
seems more at home in Saudi Arabia, where Hamza Kashgari recently
fled for his life after tweeting that he would not bow to Mohammed
but  rather  shake  hands  “as equals  do.”188 The views expressed by the
twenty-three-year-old prompted Saudi Sheikh Nasser Al Omar to
break down in tears while pleading, between sobs, for the Saudi king

own-safety-20101207-18n2p.html.
183 Diaa Hadid, Activists: Climate of Intolerance in West Bank, WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan.
29, 2012), http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/29/activists-climate-intolerance-westbank/.
184 Id.
185 Man   Arrested   for   ‘Cursing   God’, MA’AN NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 18, 2011, 9:41 AM),
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=437590.
186 Id. (quotations omitted).
187 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-505, PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: U.S.
ASSISTANCE IS TRAINING AND EQUIPPING SECURITY FORCES, BUT THE PROGRAM NEEDS TO
MEASURE PROGRESS AND FACES LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS 17, 45 (2010). See also Rule of
Law Section, EU CO-ORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT,
http://www.eupolcopps.eu/content/rule-law-section (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (describing an
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories); PCP and EUPOL COPPS Deliver Pilot
Human Rights Training, EU CO-ORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT (July
9, 2011), http://www.eupolcopps.eu/content/pcp-and-eupol-copps-deliver-pilot-human-rightstraining (describing a training mission undertaken by the EU Police Mission).
188 Priyanka Boghani, Hamza Kashgari, Saudi Writer, Arrested in Malaysia for Offensive
Tweet,
GLOBAL
POST
(Feb.
10,
2012,
11:23
AM),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/saudi-arabia/120210/hamzakashgari-saudi-writer-arrested-malaysia.
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to arrest Kashgari and charge him with apostasy.189 Kashgari’s  shortlived effort to flee the Saudi kingdom ended when he was detained
and   promptly   deported   from   Malaysia   “for   allegedly   insulting   Islam  
and the Prophet Muhammad.”190 As this Article goes to press,
Kashgari remains  in  a  prison  in  the  capital,  Riyadh,  “with  no  official  
word on if and  when  he  will  stand  trial.”191
Coupled with ongoing subjective and discriminatory prosecutions
of expression premised on protecting religious beliefs, certain states
continue to proffer distortive assessments of the extent to which their
legal regimes comport with international human rights standards.
These inconsistencies should receive more active and critical
attention, particularly where states purport to faithfully abide by
international norms. Examples of selective rendering of human rights
compliance abound, particularly in the area of protecting freedom of
religion and belief. For example, in a report submitted to the UN
Secretary   General,   Pakistan   reiterated   its   view   that   “the   ways   and  
means of addressing the issues of defamation and discrimination
based on religion   and   belief”   should   be   strengthened   and  
diversified.192 To this end, Pakistan highlighted steps taken to
promote interfaith harmony and to combat vilification of religions,
including  the  use  of  “Sections  295,  295–A, 296, 297 and 298 of the
Pakistan  Penal  Code.”193
189 J. David Goodman, In Morocco and Saudi Arabia, Limits Seen to Speech on Social
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012, 2:08 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/inmorocco-and-saudi-arabia-limits-seen-to-speech-on-socialmedia/?scp=1&sq=Hamza%20Kashgari&st=cse.
190 Boghani, supra note 188 (quotations omitted). See also Saudi Detained in Malaysia for
Insulting
Prophet
Tweet,
BBC
NEWS
(Feb.
10,
2012,
3:22
AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16977903.
191 Ellen Knickmeyer, Saudi Youth Fear Crackdown   After   Friend’s   Arrest, WALL ST.
JOURNAL, Apr. 7, 2012, A7. Other Twitter users are finding their tweets subject to similar
scrutiny. Kuwaiti authorities arrested Hamad al-Naqi  in  March  2012  for  allegedly  “defaming  the  
Islamic faith and the Prophet, his   companions   and   his   wife.”   Ahmed   Hagagy   and   Sylvia  
Westall, Kuwaiti denies insulting Prophet on Twitter - lawyer, REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/kuwait-twitter-idUSL6E8F30J420120403. In the
wake of this arrest, Kuwaiti lawmakers have voted in favor of increasing the legal penalty from
a   jail   term   to   death   for   insulting   God   and   the   prophet   Mohammed.   “Members   of   parliament  
must vote on the proposal again in a second session and it would need the approval of the
country’s  ruler  before  becoming  law.”  Parliament votes for death penalty in blasphemy cases,
IRISH
TIMES,
Apr.
13,
2012,
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0413/1224314681842.html. For another
potential emerging case, see also Another Twitter user accused of apostasy, EMIRATES 24/7,
Mar. 25, 2012, http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/another-twitter-user-accused-ofapostasy-2012-03-25-1.450274 (noting outcry among Saudi Twitter users calling for arrest of
Mohammed Salama for posting allegedly blasphemous statements concerning Islam).
192 U.N. Secretary-General, Combating Defamation of Religions: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/66/372 (Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General,
Combating Defamation].
193 Id.
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What Pakistani authorities omit from this rose-colored portrayal of
religious freedom is the fact that the penal code continues to serve as
the wellspring for justifying intolerance and persecution of religious
minorities. In addition to its selective enforcement, the penal code
provides for, among other things, wildly disproportionate penalties
when the religion criticized is Islam,194 the absence of any mens rea
requirement  for  “directly  or  indirectly,  defil[ing]  the  sacred  name  of  
the  Holy  Prophet  Muhammad”  or  other  Muslim  “holy  personages,”195
and the criminalization of elements of the Ahmadi faith.196
Not to be outdone, Qatar reported to the UN Secretary General:
. . . that its society is governed by moral, social, religious and
cultural values that promote equality and prohibit
discrimination . . . . These values are inspired by the Islamic
faith and reflected in the Constitution and relevant legislation
. . . . The State is striving to become a model of peaceful
coexistence between different faiths . . . and ensuring respect
for religious freedoms.197
Remarkably in the same report, Qatar cited provisions from its
Criminal Code as an example of its comportment with international
standards.198 But from an international human rights perspective,
these provisions on their face embody precisely the kinds of norms
that operate to violate the principles of equality, discrimination, and
freedom of religion or belief. Under Qatari law, an individual is
subject to:
up  to  seven  years’  imprisonment for denigrating or insulting
the deity by any means; making insulting, disparaging or
blasphemous remarks about the Koran; making insulting
remarks about Islam or an Islamic ritual; defaming any of the
revealed religions; insulting the prophet of a religion; or
desecrating a place of worship of a revealed religion or any
object found in that place.199
194 Compare PAK. PENAL CODE art. 295–B (providing a punishment of imprisonment for
life for “wilfully defil[ing], damag[ing] or desecrat[ing] a copy of the Holy  Qur’an”)  and PAK.
PENAL CODE, art. 295–C (providing for the punishment of death or life imprisonment for the use
of derogatory remarks concerning the Holy Prophet Muhammad), with PAK. PENAL CODE art.
295, 295(a) (providing for less severe penalties for offenses against other religions).
195 PAK. PENAL CODE art. 295–C, 298–A.
196 PAK. PENAL CODE art. 298–B–C.
197 U.N. Secretary-General, Combating Defamation, supra note 192, ¶ 58.
198 Id. ¶ 60.
199 Id. ¶ 60. The   term   “revealed   religions”   typically   includes   only   Islam,   Judaism   and  
Christianity. For a longer discussion of how this term has been employed by the OIC and others,
see Blitt, supra note 4, at 156–159.
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The selective and distortive interpretation of human rights law
illustrated in these examples sheds light on the unlikely durability of
the 2011 consensus insofar as these state practices betray a disconnect
between Resolution 16/18 and the willingness to abandon criminal
prosecution of individuals who are perceived to insult or criticize
certain protected religious views. Accordingly, such laws should be
utilized as a tangible departure point for renewed diplomatic
engagement to encourage states to take another look at the risks
associated with condoning a loose interpretation of standards and
norms associated with combating intolerance or upholding
defamation of religion. This dialogue should prompt some hard
questions. For example, Should we rethink celebrating an
international   “consensus”   on   combating intolerance where certain
state practices operate in direct opposition to it? Moreover, given the
linkage between incitement and defamation espoused by certain
states, should implementation measures around Resolution 16/18
reasonably proceed without first clearly precluding the lawfulness of
defamation of religion? Based on the outcome of these dialogues, a
sharper sense of Resolution 16/18’s   viability should emerge,
including whether a return to the more fundamental and still
unresolved debate over the legitimacy of defamation of religion may
be necessary.
D. Fight Intolerance at Home
The United States and others should take concrete measures to
address the more egregious instances of state-sanctioned or tolerated
discrimination, particularly as it may relate to profiling, dress codes
and other measures that may impinge on religious freedom. Further,
the government and other community leaders should take a more
proactive  approach  to  unequivocally  denounce  “grassroots”  and  statebased initiatives that feed and breed xenophobia.200
In  a  number  of  recent  incidents  “internal”  public  diplomacy  could  
have done more to educate and avert potentially discriminatory state
action. For example, in Tennessee, state legislators attempted to brand
200 Other examples beyond the United States come to mind, such as the Swiss ban on
minarets, also approved by public referendum. To date, the European Court of Human Rights
has declared two petitions on this issue inadmissible because the plaintiffs lacked standing as
victims. Petitioners in both cases had neither sought nor been denied authorization by the Swiss
authorities to construct a minaret. See Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human
Rights, Prohibition on Building Minarets in Switzerland: Applications Inadmissible (Jul. 8,
2011),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=open&documentId=887994&portal=hbkm&s
ource=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
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any organization that endorses sharia as a terrorist group. The wildly
xenophobic draft bill asserted, among other things, that:
[K]nowing adherence to sharia and to foreign sharia
authorities is prima facie evidence of an act in support of the
overthrow of the United States government and the
government of this state through the abrogation, destruction,
or violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions
by the likely use of imminent criminal violence and terrorism
with the aim of imposing sharia on the people of this state.201
Ultimately, in the face of public outcry and media attention, the final
bill as passed erased any mention of sharia.202
In another widely publicized instance from 2010, Oklahoma voters
were presented with a referendum question that ostensibly sought to
“Save Our State”203 by ostracizing a single religion for discriminatory
treatment at the hands of the government.204 Seventy percent of voters
endorsed the constitutional amendment which proposed expressly
“forbid[ding]  courts  from  considering  or  using  international law . . . .
[or] Sharia Law.”205 A   court   petition   challenging   the   amendment’s  
constitutionality resulted in a temporary restraining order followed by
a   preliminary   injunction   enjoining   the   state   “from   certifying   the  
election  results  for  State  Question  755.”206 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the injunction based on the
plaintiff’s   Establishment   Clause   claim   that   the   amendment  
condemned Islam and exposed Muslims to disfavored treatment.207
201 S.B. 1028, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (as introduced by Sen. Ketron). For the
bill’s   complete   legislative   history,   see   Bill Information for SB1028, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB1028&ga=107
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
202 Pub. Charter No. 497, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011). For press accounts covering
public opposition and subsequent amendments to the bill, see Andrea Zelinski, Critics Say AntiTerrorism Bill Went from Bad to Worse to Much, Much Better, TN REPORT (June 3, 2011),
http://www.tnreport.com/2011/06/critics-say-anti-terrorism-bill-went-from-bad-to-worse-tobetter/ and Bob Smietana, Tenn. Bill Criticized for Targeting Muslims Splits Tea Party, USA
TODAY (May 22, 2011 6:16 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-05-22-tennesseebill-tea-party_n.htm.
203 Bill
Information for HJR 1056 (2009–2010), OKLA. ST. LEGIS.,
http://newlsb.lsb.state.ok.us/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HJR1056&Session=1000 (last visited Mar. 26,
2012).
204 The question only landed on the ballot after securing 41–2 and 82–10 majorities in the
state Senate and House respectively. Id.
205 State Questions for General Election, Nov. 2, 2010, OKLA. ST. ELECTION BOARD, at 7
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/sq_gen10.pdf; Summary Results:
General
Election—Nov.
2,
2010,
OKLA.
ST.
ELECTION
BOARD,
http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
206 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d   No. 10–6273,
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 475 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012).
207 Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10–6273, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 475, at *37–40 (10th Cir. Jan.
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While the courts rightly identified this anti-constitutional and antiAmerican initiative for what it was, the reality remains that measures
like it tap into a bigoted stream of the political discourse in the United
States and elsewhere.208 These and other proposed measures that
violate domestic constitutional law and international law principles
present a concrete opportunity for civil society and government to get
in front of manifestations of intolerance. This can be done through
non-legislative measures designed to ostracize those that would
discriminate, impose unequal treatment, or otherwise unduly restrict
freedom of religion or belief. Public outcry, media attention, and
reliance on the judiciary can all be effective tools. But each can be
bolstered through ongoing educational efforts to help authoritatively
dispel oversimplification and misconceptions concerning minority
groups, religious practices, and even the function and status of
domestic law. Moreover, these measures are in no way contingent on
UN resolutions, and can serve as a tangible and good faith
demonstration of the sincere commitment to combat intolerance and
discrimination based on religious belief. Importantly, they also do not
require relying on tactics that themselves foster an environment of
discrimination and inequality, which in turn prohibit fair exercise of
freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.
CONCLUSION
This Article has called attention to the flaws underpinning current
efforts to move away from the decade old debate over defamation of
religion. By advancing a consensus approach to combatting
intolerance without addressing and accounting for the false linkages
that continue to be made between incitement and defamation, states
concerned with protecting human rights have created an opening that
risks perpetuating defamation-type offenses under the ostensible
sanction of international law.

10, 2012).
208 The failed Oklahoma initiative aligns with Republican presidential candidate hopeful
Newt   Gingrich’s   endorsement   of   “hav[ing]   a   federal   law   that   says   under   no   circumstances   in  
any jurisdiction in the United States will Sharia [law] be used in any court to apply to any
judgment  made  about  American  law.”  Marc  Ambinder,  Oklahoma’s  Preemptive  Strike  Against  
Sharia
Law,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
25,
2010,
10:10
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/10/oklahomas-preemptive-strike-againstsharia-law/65081/; see also Scott Shane, In Islamic Law, Gingrich Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at  A2  (discussing  Newt  Gingrich’s  position  on  Sharia  law); Andrea
Elliot, Behind an Anti-Sharia Push, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at A1 (discussing the national
movement against Sharia law, including the Oklahoma constitutional amendment).
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The evidence discussed above should shatter any illusion
regarding a genuine consensus around an approach to combatting
intolerance premised   on   “open   public   debate   of   ideas”   and  
“foster[ing]   religious   freedom   and   pluralism.”209 Malaysia’s  
deplorable yet perfunctory decision   to   abide   by   Saudi   Arabia’s  
request for the deportation of alleged blasphemer Hamza Kashgari is
deadly evidence that defamation of religion remains alive and well,
and has even garnered sufficient international legitimacy to warrant
summary extradition for the purpose of its speedy enforcement. From
this perspective, the consensus approach also has failed in a
profoundly practical regard by doing nothing to curb prosecutions of
individuals on the basis of utterances or actions deemed blasphemous
of a predominant faith. A potential death sentence for three little
tweets throws this reality into unsettling relief.
This grim reality should be deeply disturbing to those concerned
with maintaining the integrity of the international human rights
framework. More immediately, however, it should serve as a trigger
for reassessing the wisdom of a consensus strategy premised upon
sidestepping or ignoring the specter of defamation of religion. Rather
than maintain the delusion that combating intolerance will prove a
viable end to a divisive debate, we must acknowledge that any
genuine consensus on this issue is destined to fail unless defamation
of religion is formally repudiated. Until such a time, progress within
the Istanbul Process should be suspended. Concerned diplomats and
human rights activists alike should return to familiar if divisive fault
lines and redouble efforts to condemn and abolish the criminal
offense   of   blasphemy.   In   Kashgari’s   case,   such   efforts   could—and
should—have included massive international pressure on Malaysia to
refuse the Saudi request to deport.210
209 Human

Rights Council Res. 16/18, supra note 7, ¶4 and ¶6(b).
White House and State Department have remained conspicuously silent, at least
publicly,   concerning   Malaysia’s   decision   to   deport   and   Kashgari’s   uncertain   status   in   Saudi  
Arabia. Patrick Goodenough, Obama Administration Silent on Saudi Journalist Accused of
Online Blasphemy, CNS NEWS, Feb. 15, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obamaadministration-silent-saudi-journalist-accused-online-blasphemy. Remarks and a Q&A session
during  Secretary  Clinton’s  trip  to  Riyadh  at  the  end  of  March  2012  likewise  made  no  mention  of  
Kashgari’s  case  or  his  continued  detention.  Remarks With Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud
Al-Faisal, Mar. 31, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/187245.htm. The
European   Union   managed   to   produce   several   weakly   worded   statements   expressing   “deep[]  
disappoint[ment]”   with   Malaysia’s   decision   to   deport.   According   to   Catherine   Ashton’s  
spokeswoman,  “The  EU  will  continue  taking  all  appropriate  steps  to  achieve  a  positive  outcome  
of   Mr   Kashgari's   case.”   AFP,   Saudi blogger Hamza Kashgari, facing possible execution for
tweets,
to
be interrogated,
NATIONAL
POST,
Feb
14,
2012,
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/02/14/saudi-blogger-hamza-kashgari-facing-possibleexecution-for-tweets-to-be-interrogated/. Speaking at the opening of a plenary session of the EU
Parliament,   President,   Martin   Schulz   “stressed   the   need   to   protect   freedom   of   expression   and  
210 The
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More generally moving forward, governments that previously
voted against UN defamation of religion resolutions should inquire of
their counterparts that abstained whether they view the fate of
Kashgari and others similarly situated as comporting with
international human rights law protections. Likewise, individual OIC
members with ties to western states should be surveyed and new postArab Spring governments coming online should be encouraged to
clearly set out their intentions with respect to international human
rights obligations. These efforts may bear fruit in identifying a
previously unavailable critical mass of states willing to overturn the
UN’s  defamation of religion precedent. At the same time, a good faith
effort to address genuine claims of discrimination, intolerance and
incitement should proceed apace, despite a freeze on identifying
implementing norms relating to Resolution 16/18 and its offspring.
These measures can go a long way in building good will and
demonstrating a sincere commitment to tackling the challenge of
intolerance without recourse to criminal punishment. Even if a UNsanctioned rejection of defamation of religion proves unachievable
and we are left debating its illegitimacy, nothing can justify
supporting a framework intended to combat intolerance that allows
acts of unbridled intolerance to continue to flourish.

undertook to do all he could to prevent a death sentence  being  pronounced.”  It  remains  unclear  
however, what, if any, subsequent measures the EU may have taken in this regard. European
Parliament, Minutes Monday, 13 February 2012 – Strasbourg, Item 13: Statements by the
President,
Feb.
13,
2012,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+PV+20120213+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN. See also European
Parliament, Opening: Saudi journalist faces death penalty, discriminatory Dutch web site, Feb.
13,
2012,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20120203FCS37185/2/html/OpeningSaudi-journalist-faces-death-penalty-discriminatory-Dutch-web-site.
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